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1. INTRODUCTION 
This  tudy  considers  the  design  and  igital  simulation of an integrated fault 
tolerant  system (FTS) using  analytic  redundancy  for  avionics  ensors  on  the NASA- 
Langley  Research  Center  Advanced  Transport  Operating  Systems (ATOPS) Transport 
Systems  Research  Vehicle (TSRV) in a Microwave  Landing  System (MLS) environment. 
The  overall  objective of the  fault   tolerant  system  is   to  provide  reliable  estimates  for 
aircraft position, velocity, and attitude in the presence of possible failures in ground- 
based  navigation  aids,  and  on-board  flight  control  and  navigation  sensors. '   The 
estimates,  provided  by  the  fault  tolerant  system,  are  used by  a  fully  automated 
guidance  and  control  system  to  land  th,e  aircraft  along  aprescribed  path.  Sensor 
failures are identified by utilizing the analytic relationship between the various sensor 
outputs  ar is ing from the aircraf t  equat ions of motion [l]. 
An aircraft sensor  fault  tolerant  system  design  methodology is developed  by 
formulating  the  problem  in  the  context of simultaneous  state  estimation  and  failure 
identification in discrete time nonlinear stochastic systems. The resulting sensor fault 
tolerant system consists of 1) a no-fail estimator, implemented as an extended Kalman 
fi l ter  (EKF) based  on  the  assumption of no  failures,  which  provides  estimates  for 
aircraft   state  variables  and  normal  operating  sensor  biases;  2) a bank of detectors  
which  are first order  filters  for  estimating  bias  jump  failures  in  sensor  outputs; 3) 
likelihood  ratio  computers;  and 4) a decision  function  which  selects  the  most  likely 
' I n t e g r a t e d  FTS r e f e r s   t o   t h e   c a p a b i l i t y   o f   h a n d l i n g  a1 I o f   these   th ree   d i f fe rent   sensor  
s u b s e t s   s i m u l t a n e o u s l y   i n   c o n t r a s t   t o   e a r l i e r   s t u d i e s   i n   w h i c h   o n l y  one  subset  such  as 
f l i g h t   c o n t r o l   o r   n a v i g a t i o n   s e n s o r 3   a r e   c o n s i d e r e d .  
1 
failure mode based on the likelihood ratios. 
The operation of the faul t  tolerant  system is as follows: First, the EKF' computes 
estimates  for aircraft   posit ion,   velocity,   at t i tude,   horizontal   winds,   and  normal 
operating sensor biases on the assumption of no sensor failures.  The residuals of this 
EKF drive  a  bank of detectors, where each detector has been designed to estimate a 
postulated  bias  jump  failure  for  a given  sensor.  Then,  a multiple  hypothesis  testing 
procedure is employed to decide whether the EKF is operating with healthy sensors or 
under  one of the  hypothesized  failed  sensor  modes.  The  multiple  hypothesis  test 
selects the most likely failure mode based on the likelihood ratios which are computed 
using  the  bias jump  failure  estimates  from  the  detectors. When a  failure is declared 
by the decision logic,  the fi l ter-detector structure is  reconfigured by eliminating the 
failed sensor,  making the appropriate changes in the no-fail  f i l ter  and detectors,  and 
reinitializing the likelihood ratios and a priori probabilities. 
The no-fail filter is implemented in a rectangular coordinate system with origin 
on the runway by using a new separated bias EKF algorithm which has been obtained 
by extending  the  known  results  for  the  l inear  case  to nonlinear  systems. Body 
mounted accelerometers and rate gyros form the inputs  into the EKF, while MLS range, 
azimuth,  elevation  measurements, IAS (indicated  airspeed),  and IMU (inertial 
measurement  unit)  attitude  outputs  are utilized  asmeasurements  by  the EKF. 
Alternatively,  an RSDIMU (dual  fail-operational  two-degree-of-freedom  strapdown 
inertial  measurement  unit [SI) can  be  used  instead  of  a  platform IMU and  the  body 
mounted  accelerometers  and  rate  gyros.  The function of the  no-fail  filter is similar 
t o   t h a t  of a  navigator  coordinatized  in  a local  runway  frame of reference.  Whereas 
2 
traditional  navigation  equations  usually  involve  open  loop  integration of the  body 
accelerations in the runway frame with occasional posit ion and velocity fixes,  the no- 
fail EKF in  our  study  performs  the  position,  velocity,  and attitude  updates 
continuously in a closed loop fashion. 
The  proposed  filter-detector  structure  is computationally  feasible.  The 
integrated  sensor  FTS design  requires a single  high  order EKF (no-fail  filter).  The 
state  st imation  and  failure  detection.  performance of the  developed  sensor  fault 
tolerant system is analyzed by using a nonlinear six-degree-of-freedom simulation of 
t he  TSRV aircraft .  
In th i s   repor t ,  we will discuss  the failure  d tection  a d  isolation (FDI) 
performance of the system using a dual-redundant sensor configuration. In par t icular  
the  system will be  shown  capable of detecting  failures  even i f  only  one  sensor of a 
given type remains. 
The sensor fault tolerant algorithm developed here has been incorporated into a 
computer program called FINDS (Fault inferring Nonlinear ' Detection System) which is 
described  in  detail  in [2]. The  simulation  portion of the  software is essentially  an 
integrat ion of t he  NASA-LRC supplied TSRV and RSDIMU computer simulation programs. 
Arcraft  sensor  models  have  been  developed  and  appended  into  the  simulation  to 
provide more realistic normal operating errors. Furthermore, sensor failure models for 
increased  bias,  hardover,  null,  scale  factor,  ramp,  and  increased  noise  type  sensor 
malfunctions have also been assimilated into the software. 
3 
The  simulation  results  indicate  that  the  no-fail EKF estimation  errors  compare 
favorably to those obtained with other types of navigation filters employed in the same 
MLS environment. Sensor failure detection performance of the fault tolerant system is 
excellent for the EKF measurement sensors such as MLS, IAS, and M U ,  while the failure 
detection speed for the EKF input sensors such as accelerometers and rate gyros has 
been found to be slower than that of measurement sensors. 
1.1 Relation t o  Previous Work 
Here, we will discuss  the  differences  between  the  major  aspects of  FINDS and 
earlier  sensor  failure  detection  studies  uch as the  nonlinear  multiple  hypothesis 
testing  approach,  reported  in [20]-[21], F-8 DFBW [25], DIGITAC A7 [ 2 4 ] ,  and  the 
RSDIMU [23] FDI studies. 
o sensor complement 
FINDS is an integrated FTS in the sense that failures in on-board flight control 
as well as inertial  sensors  and ground-based  navigation-aid  instruments  are 
considered.  For  instance, FINDS can  detect  not  only a fault  in  an  on-board MLS 
receiver, but also a fault in the ground-based transmitting antenna for that receiver. 
FINDS can  operate  without  any  hardware  redundancy  in  that  it  can  detect  failures 
even if there remains only one sensor of a given type. 
In contrast ,  earlier studies are concerned with only a single subset of the sensor  
complement considered here. For instance,  the F-8 and DIGITAC A-’7 studies deal with 
flight  control  sensors  only  and  the RSDIMU  FDI considers  failures  only  in  inertial 
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sensors.  F-8 FDI requires  dual  sensor  redundancy so that ,  if  only  one  sensor of a 
given  type  remains  in  the  configuration,  then  the  failure of that  sensor  cannot  be 
detected. 
o FDI algorithm structure 
FINDS has  a single large order estimator (no-fail filter) driven by all the sensor 
outputs.  Failures  are  identified  by  analyzing  the  signature of sensor  faults  on  the 
no-fail  residuals by processing  the  residual  sequence  through a bank of first-order 
detectors.  The estimator/detector structure in FINDS is an extension of the s t ructure  
used in [27] to nonlinear dynamic systems. 
In contrast, the nonlinear multiple hypothesis testing approach [21] requires the 
implementation of M + l  (where M is the total number of sensors) large order estimators 
(each of which has  complexity equal to the no-fail filter in FINDS). In F-8 FDI, each 
sensor  output  is  estimated by using a subset of the  other  available  sensor  types  in 
order  to  have  three  voting  sensors (2 hardware/l  analytically  constructed).  Hence, 
the  number of filters  (each with a different  order  depending  on  the analytic 
relationships  used)  are  equal  to  the  number of sensor  types. In DIGITAC A7, several 
different filter assemblies of varying orders with comparators are used. 
o treatment of nonlinearities 
FINDS analyzes  the  residuals of a nonlinear  no-fail  filter  by  processing  them 
through  nonlinear  detectors  to  find  sensor  faults. One advantage of using  nonlinear 
filters is that  the  fault  tolerant  system  is  independent of the  flight path so that  i t  
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does not need gain scheduling. 
On the other hand, the nonlinear fi l ter  residuals in [21] are directly used in the 
likelihood  ratio  computations  without  any  processing.  Similarly,  in  F-8 FDI, some 
nonlinear filters are used but only for constructing sensor outputs. 
o state  stimation 
FINDS supplies  the  vehicle  state  stimates  used  by  the  guidance  and  flight 
control  algorithms.  That  is  to  say,  the  no-fail  filter  in  our  application would have 
been  there  even i f  there  were  no  sensor  fault  monitoring  system.  Consequently,  the 
no-fail  filter  should  not  be  considered  an  additional  requirement.  Therefore,  in 
comparing the complexity of  FINDS with other  FDI applications, only the bank of first- 
order  detectors  in FINDS should  be  .considered.  For  instance,  the  complexity of the 
bank of first-order detectors are roughly equivalent to the bank of filters in the F-8 
FDI study. 
o normal operating errors 
In FINDS, important  normal  operating  sensor  biases  are  stimated  in  order  to 
remove their  false  alarm  effects.  Sensor  failures  are modelled as  bias  jumps with 
infinite uncertainty whereas a sensor normal operating error is modeled by a constant 
random  variable  with a finite  uncertainty  (as  defined  by  the  sensor  specifications). 
Hence,  the  no-fail  filter  attempts  to  distinguish  between a normal  operating  sensor 
bias  and a bias  jump  failure  in  that  sensor. On the  other  hand,  in F-8 FDI. normal 
operating  sensor  biases  are  considered  only  in  the  selection of decision  thresholds. 
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In the  RSDIMU work, the sensor operating errors (biases as well as scale factors and 
misalignment) are used in the selection of thresholds. 
o information  pattern 
Finally, FINDS looks at  all  sensor  outputs  imultaneously in deciding a sensor 
fault ,  in contrast  to other FDI studies in which only those sensors explicitly related to 
a specific  sensor  are  used  in  deciding  whether  that  sensor is at   fault  or not.  For 
instance,  in F-8 FDI study, a roll  attitude  sensor  failure  is  decided by  considering 
only  the  roll  rate,  pitch,  and yaw att i tude  sensors while ignoring  the  analytic 
redundancy from the other  sensors .  On the other hand, FINDS looks a t  all of the  ra te  
a t t i tude  sensors   as  well as   o ther  dynamically  coupled  sensors  in deciding a roll 
attitude  sensor  failure.  Hence, FDI information  contained  in  the  dynamic  redundancy 
of all sensor outputs are simultaneously used in FINDS. Of the other studies,  only the  
detection  and  estimation  algorithm of the multiple  hypothesis  testing  approach would 
be  more  optimal  (least  mean  square  sense)  than  that  employed  in FINDS, but only a t  
the expense of a severe computational burden. 
The organization of the report is as follows. The developed fault tolerant system 
methodology  is  described in Chapter 11. A tutorial description of each major  block of 
the  FTS is given in Section 2.1. Analytic description of the developed FTS is contained 
in Sections 2.2-2.6. This chapter ends with  Section 2.7 where  an  illustrative  example 
is given  showing the  exploited  failure  signature in the  design.  Chapter I11 examines 
the  simulated  performance of the  developed FTS. Conclusions are  presented  in
Chapter IV. 

2. FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEM 
In this   chapter   the  analyt ical   s t ructure  of the  developed  aircraft   sensor  fault  
tolerant navigation system will be discussed in detail. 
The  objective of the  fault   olerant  system  is  t o  provide  reliable  aircraft  state 
estimates t o  an automated guidance and control system which accomplishes automatic 
landing  in  an MLS environment. The  developed  fault  tolerant  system  can  detect 
failures  in avigation-aid  instruments  (e.g.  on-board  navaid  receiver  as well a s  
ground-based navaid antenna failures),  on-board inertial ,  and fl ight control sensors.  
Since the developed FTS uses the analytic redundancy between various sensor outputs 
arising  from  aircraft  equations of motion,  sensor  failures  can  be  detected  even if 
there   is  only  one  sensor of a given  type  in the  configuration. We envision  the 
practical   use of our  developed FTS in  a tr iple  or  dual  redundant  (or  combinations 
thereof)  sensor  configuration. For instance,   our  FTS would  improve  the  fail-op/fail- 
safe capability of a triple redundant voting system t o  at least a fail-op/fail-op/fail- 
safe capability. 
Basically, the fault tolerant system consists of a navigation filter conditioned on 
the assumption of no  failures,  followed by a  bank of low-order  failure  detectors  and 
their companion decision and reconfiguration logic. The estimation, detection, decision 
and  reconfiguration  algorithms  are  derived by using  nonlinear  aircraft  point  mass 
equations of motion. 
Although simpler linear filtering algorithms could have been used, the nonlinear 
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filtering  algorithms  used  in our FTS have  the  advantage of being  independent of 
landing  path  and  selected  trim  conditions. In contrast,  linear  filtering  algorithms2 
would necessitate the scheduling of gains. 
The outline of Chapter I1 is as follows. An overall  description of the  fault- 
tolerant  system is given in  Section  2.1  by  going  over  the  operation of each major 
block. The aircraft point mass equations of motion and sensor dynamics, on which the 
filter-detector  development is based, is then  discussed  in  Section  2.2.  Section  2.2 
also  outlines  the  operation of the  no-fail  filter.  Failure  detector  implementation is 
discussed  in  Section  2.3,  and  in  Section  2.4,  the employed  decision  rule is explained. 
Tests  for  multiple  simultaneous  failures  are  discussed  inSection  2.6. The next 
section,  2.5, describes  the  operation of healing  tests. In Section  2.6,  the 
reinitialization  procedure is outlined. An example,  designed t o  highlight  he  various 
failure  signature  information  contained  in  the  no-fail  filter  residuals, is given  in 
Section 2.9. 
2.1 Fault  Tolerant  System Overview 
The  design  problem  in  our  application  can  be  broadly  stated as follows: Given 
redundant  discrete-time  measurements of various  navigation-aid  and  on-board  flight 
control  and  inertial  sensor  measurements  on  an  aircraft,  generate  estimates  for  the 
vehicle  states  required by the  automatic  guidance  and  control laws  in the  possible 
presence of failures  in these  sensors. The desired FTS qualities  dictated by our 
'Except,  of  course, i f  a constant   ga in   l inear   navigo 
sa t is fac tory   es t imat ion   per formance .  
t i o n   f i l t e r   c o u l d  be des igned  with 
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appl icat ion are  the following: 
use  inherent  analytic  redundancy  arising  from  a  knowledge of the   a i rc raf t  
dynamics so that  hardware redundancy requirements  are  reduced for  a  given 
mission reliability 
fast detection of hard failures,  and detection of mid- and soft-level failures 
before their effects on system performance become significant 
ability  to  handle  different  ypes of failures  (i.e.  hardover,  null,  increased 
inaccuracy, ramp, etc.  
acceptable false alarm/detection probabili ty performance in the presence of 
colored measurement noises (since MLS sensor noises are t ime-correlated in 
our application and induce an unacceptably high false alarm rate if they  a re  
not compensated) 
distinguish  between  ormal  operating  sensor  errors,   such  as  biases,   and 
sensor  failures  ( this  issue  is  especially  cri t ical   since  most  analytic FTS 
techniques model failures as bias jumps in sensor outputs) 
ability  to  recover  from  false  alarms  which  occur  during  aircraft  maneuvers 
due t o  misalignment and scale factor errors in body-mounted instruments 
feasible  computational  complexity  enabling  future  on-board  real-time 
implementation with appropriate modifications. 
With these goals in mind, the aircraft sensor fault detection design problem w a s  
formulated  in  the  context of simultaneous  tate  estimation  and  failure  detection  in 
nonlinear  discrete  time  stochastic  systems.  Figure 1 displays  the  major  components of 
the  resu l t ing  f i l t e r -de tec tor  s t ruc ture .  The major pa r t s  of this system are as follows: 
o a  nonlinear  no-fail  filter  which  estimates  aircraft  states  and  sensor  biases 
assuming no sensor failures 
o a  bank of first-order  detectors  which  estimate  hypothesized  sensor  failure 
levels using the residuals of the no-fail filter as inputs 
o likelihood  ratio  computers,  driven  by  the  detector  outputs,  which  perform 
the necessary computations for the multiple failure hypotheses 
o a decision  rule  which  selects  the  most  likely  failure  mode  based on the  
likelihood ratios 
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o a reconfiguration module  which performs  the  various  reinitialization 
procedures after the detection of a failure 
o a healing test module  which  monitors t he  failed  sensors  to  check  their 
possible recovery. 
The fault tolerant system is concerned with failures in the sensor configuration 
consisting of: 
o body  mounted  accelerometers (A,,Ay,A,) 
o body  mounted  rate  gyros  (P,Q,R) 
o microwave  landing  system (MLS) 
o indicated  airspeed (IAS) 
o IMU att i tudes from a stabilized platform (+,e,+) 
o radar  altimeter (RA) 
The three  body  mounted  accelerometers  and  rate  gyros  above  are  flight  control 
quality  sensors,  each of which is aligned  along  one of t he  body  frame  axes. An 
alternative sensor complement, containing a prototype dual-fail operational Redundant 
Strapped-Down  Inertial  Measurement Unit (RSDIMU), is  also  considered. In this sensor 
configuration,  body  mounted  accelerometers  and  angular  ate  gyros  are  replaced  by 
the navigation quality acceleration and rate measurements from the  RSDIMU while the 
RSDIMU attitude outputs replace the IMU Euler angle measurements. 
The navigation  aid is a ground-based Microwave Landing  System (MLS) which 
transmits  position  information  to  aircraft  within its volumetric  coverage  at  discrete 
time intervals. The MLS (see  Figure 2) consists of a Distance  Measuring  Equipment 
(DME) providing  aircraft  range  information,  an  azimuth  antenna  co-located  with  the 
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DME provides  the  aircraft 's   angle  relative  to  the  runway,  and  an  elevation  antenna, 
located  near   the  gl ide  path  intercept   point   provides   the  a i rcraf t   wi th  its clevation 
angle relative to the local horizon. 
The radar alt imeter replaces the MLS elevation measurement when the aircraft is 
over the runway during which the elevation measurements are normally invalid. In the  
next six subsections,  we will describe each major block of the fault tolerant system. 
2.1.1 No-Fail Filter 
The  no-fail  filter  shown  in  Figure 1 is an  extended Kalman Filter (EKF') [15] 
which is designed on the assumption of no failures. Although we have used an EKF in 
our  study,  any  other  nonlinear  filter  could  have  been  used  without  significantly 
affecting  the  failure  detection  algorithms. We have  chosen  a  nonlinear  filtering 
formulation  i   rder  to  have  afl ight  path  independent  estimator.  The EKF 
development  is  based  on  a  discrete-time  difference  quation  for  the  aircraft  point 
mass equations of motion  mechanized  ina ground-based,  flat  earth  Cartesian 
coordinate  system  with its origin  located on the  runway  (Figure 3). This  nonlinear, 
stochastic difference equation is obtained by  transforming the specific force measured 
by the  body  mounted  accelerometers  into  the  runway  frame,  and  integrating this 
expression  along  with  the  differential  equations  for  the  Euler  angles  over a fixed 
sampling interval. 
The no-fail filter provides estimates for the aircraft states, %(k), which  consist 
of aircraft  position,  velocity,  attitude,  and  horizontal  winds,  and  estimates  for  the 
"normal  operating"  biases, 6(k), associated  with a specified  subset of the  sensors .  
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State estimates provided by the no-fail filter are used by an automated guidance and 
control system to land the aircraft along a prescribed path [4]-[5],[16]-[17). 
The no-fail filter functions essentially as a navigator in this system, estimating 
the   s t a t e  of the  aircraft  and  the  "normal  operating"  biases  on  selected  sensors. 
However,  unlike  most  navigators,  this  one  continuously  filters  the  navigation  aid, IAS, 
and  attitude  measurements, so as  toconstantly  correct  the propagated  state 
estimates. In addition,  since  the  no-fail  filter is based  on  the  nonlinear  aircraft 
equations of motion, it is independent of flight path and trim conditions and does not 
require any gain scheduling. 
According  to  the  manner  processed by the  no-fail  filter,  the  replicated  sensor 
set is divided into two groups: 1) no-fail filter input sensors, u(k), consisting of body 
acceleration  and  angular  ate  measurements; 2) no-fail  filter  measurement  sensors, 
y(k),  formed by  the MLS, IAS ,  IMU, and RA outputs. The input  sensor  outputs  are 
integrated  in the  no-fail  filter,  without  any  closed-loop  filtering,  after  they  are 
compensated by the "normal-operating" bias estimates. Only one set of the replicated 
input sensors,  u(k),  and  the  average of the  replicated  measurement  sensors,  y(k),  are 
used by the no-fail filter after being processed in the "selection logic" and  "summer 
logic"  blocks.  Replicated  input  measurements  are  kept as standby  equipment.  Thus, 
the filter size is kept to a minimum without a loss of generality. 
- 
We have employed a  new separated EKF algorithm for the implementation of the  
no-fail filter [6]-[7].  The separated EKF algorithm provides a numerical decomposition 
procedure for obtaining the EKF filter gains. A t  each sampling instant, this algorithm 
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sequentially  computes: 1) a  bias-free  gain; 2) a  bias  correction  matrix; 3) a bias 
gain;  and 4) a correction  to  the  bias-free  gain.   The  separated EKF also  improves 
numerical  accuracy  since  lower  order  matrices  are  used  in  the numerical 
decomposition,  and  finite  variance  for  the  plant  state  initial  conditions,  and  infinite 
uncertainty in the a priori  bias estimates are easily handled. 
2.1.2 Detectors 
Since  the  no-fail  filter  computes  the  residuals  for  the  averaged  measurement 
sensor   outputs ,   3k) ,   the   res idual   sequences  for   the  individual   measurement   sensors ,  
y(k),  need  to  be  computed.  This  is  accomplished  in  the  "residuals  computation"  block 
by using  the  no-fail  filter 's  estimate,  F(k), f o r  the  measurement  sensor  outputs.  The 
output  of this block is the output measurement residual sequence, ro(k), which is the  
difference between the measurement sensor outputs and their  corresponding predicted 
estimates provided by the no-fail filter. This residual sequence is the same one that 
would have been generated by an EKF formulated to use the unaveraged measurements, 
When the  measurement  noises  are  zero  mean,  white,  and  Gaussian,  then  the 
residual  sequence,  ro(k),  of the  no-fail  filter -- in  the  absence of input or output 
sensor  failures -- is approximately  (exactly,  in  the  linear  case) a zero  mean,  white 
Gaussian  sequence of random  vectors. The no-fail  filter w a s  designed by  making the  
above  assumptions  for  the  measurement  oises.  However,  the MLS noise  in  our 
application is time correlated,  ra ther  than white .  This necessitated the post-fi l tering 
of t h e  MLS residuals  to  remove  these  correlations.  This was  accomplished  by  passing 
each MLS residual sequence through a first order fi l ter  also located in the "residuals 
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computation"  block.  The  measurement  residuals  are  then  used by the  bank of 
detectors.  
The bank of detectors,  which follow the residuals computation block, are a se t  of 
first order filters, each estimating the level of an hypothesized sensor failure. In the  
case of single  sensor  failures,  the  total  number of detectors  is  equal  to  the sum of 
the  number of input  sensors  and  the  number of measurement  (replicated  ones 
included)  sensors. For instance,  with  dual  sensor  redundancy,  there would be  twenty 
of these first  order detectors:  three for the body  mounted  accelerometers,  three  for 
the body  mounted rate  gyros, six for  the MLS range,  azimuth  and  elevation 
measurements, two for the IAS outputs, and six for the IMU measurements. 
Using the no-fail  filter  residuals  as  measurements,  each  detector  estimates  the 
failure level  associated with that  sensor.  Failures  are modelled as  bias  jumps in the  
measurement  equations.  Failure  bias  jumps  are  assumed  to be  zero  mean  random 
variables  with  infinite  covariance  (equivalently  zero  information). In the  linear  case, 
bias  type  sensor  failures  manifest  themselves in an  additive  fashion  onto  the  no-fail 
filter  esiduals. For the  nonlinear  problem  considered,  similar  relations  have  been 
derived by making suitable approximations. 
Each detector puts out a compensated  residual  sequence,  {r,(k),r2(k) ,..., rM(k)i, 
such that the effects of the hypothesized sensor failure are removed from the no-fail 
filter  esiduals by processing  the  stimated  sensor  failure  level.  Detectors  operate 
over a "window" of the  r siduals,  with the  initial  failure  l vel  stimates  and 
uncertainties reset at the beginning of each residual window. Each detector estimates 
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the  level of a bias  jump in the  associated  sensor  output  which is hypothesized  to 
occur   a t   the   beginning of the  corresponding window.  The s t a r t  of a new window 
determines  the  hypothesized  time of failure,   and  the maximum length of t h e  window 
determines the time to wait before initiating a new hypothesis. 
Figure 4 shows  the  synchronization of these  various  residual windows for a 
typical  run. In this   run,   the   decis ion window length is 1 second.  Estimation window 
lengths  for  input  and  measurement  sensors  are 3 and 1 seconds,  respectively. The 
length of the   hea le r  window is 3 seconds. A t  6.4  seconds,  due  to  a sensor  failure 
detection  decision,  all of the  residual windows are  restarted.  Estimation  and  healing 
(discussed in 2.1.6) residual window lengths are constrained to be integer multiples of 
the decision residual window length. 
The choice of residual window lengths is  based on the sensor type,  the expected 
failure level (hard, mid, soft), the specified probability of false alarm, and the desired 
detection  speed.  Since  the  detectors  keep  track of how each  ypothesized  sensor 
failure  propagates  through  the  no-fail  filter  dynamics  to  affect  the  no-fail  filter 
residuals,   the  sensor  type  definitely  plays  an  important  role  in  the  determination of 
residual window lengths.  For instance,  we have chosen the residual window length for 
input  sensors  tobe  three  t imes  the  l ngth  for measurement  sensors in our 
application.  Finally,  the  r sidual  windows  should  be  large  enough  to  produce  a 
tolerable probability of false alarm rate and small enough to permit rapid detection of 
sensor failures.  
In summary,  the  detector  block  consists of a  bank of first order  estimators 
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driven  by  the  expanded  innovations of the  no-fail  filter.  Each  detector  corresponds 
to  a different sensor failure hypothesis, and, corresponding to each detector, there is 
an  associated  residual  data window length. The bias  jump  magnitude  for a given 
sensor  failure,  hypothesized  to  happen  at  the  start of the  residual window, is 
estimated b y  the  detector  corresponding  to  that  sensor. The residuals of the 
detectors along with the residual of the no-fail filter are used in the likelihood ratio 
(LR) computations which are discussed in the next section. 
2.1.3 Likelihood  Ratio  Computations 
As seen  in  Figure 1, each  Compensated  residual  sequence, ri(k),  is used  in  the 
computation of the likelihood ratio, Ai(k), for hypothesis H i  corresponding to the i ' th 
sensor failure. Likelihood ratio computations are also based on a fixed window of the 
residuals. The length of this residual window for the LR computations is the same for 
every  hypothesis. However, the length of this  decision  residual window is, in  general, 
different from tha t  of the  detector  estimation  residual windows described  in the 
previous section. The likelihood  ratio,  for a particular hypothesis, H i ,  is proportional 
to  the  a posteriori  probability  (conditioned  on  the  residuals  in  the  decision window) 
that  he  compensated  residuals model (used by the  LR) corresponds  to  the  "best" 
hypothesis. 
Each  likelihood  ratio  is initialized  with  the a priori  probability P,,, of that  
hypothesis. A priori probabilities are determined from  known sensor failure rates and 
modified according  to  the  xpected  estimation  degradation  due t o  modelling errors .  
Each  likelihood  ratio  is a function of a sum of residual  quadratic  forms  weighted by 
the  residuals '   statist ics.  Likelihood ratios  are  used by the  decision  rule which is 
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discussed next. 
2.1.4 Decision Rule 
The decision  rule  selects  the most likely sensor  failure  based  on  an M-ary 
hypothesis  testing  procedure. This test  minimizes the  Bayes  risk  which is a weighted 
average of making incorrect  decisions.  These  weightings  are  shown  as the  input 
"costs" in  Figure 1. If it  is assumed  that  costs  associated with  making incorrect 
decisions (selecting hypothesis H i  when H .  is true) are all equal and those of making 
correct decisions (selecting hypothesis H i  when H i  i s  t rue)  a re  all zero, then the M- 
ary decision rule is equivalent to choosing hypothesis H i  corresponding to the largest 
a posteriori  probability. The decision  logic  provides  the output of the M-ary 
hypothesis  test  indicating  whether  the  no-fail  filter  is  operating  under no failures 
(hypothesis Ho), or under the i ' th sensor bias jump failure ( H i ) .  
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2.1.5 Reconfiguration Logic 
Once a failure  decision is reached,  the  necessary  filter/detector  changes  are 
made  in the  reconfiguration  block. For input  sensor  failures,  this  process  includes 
removing the  faulty  sensor from the no-fail  filter  inputs  and  replacing  it  with a 
redundant  one of the same  type. I f  there   are  no more healthy  sensors of that  type 
left in the stand-by queue, then the no-fail filter is restructured to reflect the loss 
of that sensor type input, provided that the filter is capable of operating without it. 
Similarly, if a measurement  sensor  fails,  then  the  faulty  sensor is removed  from the 
corresponding average and the appropriate changes in the no-fail filter statistics are 
made. Again, when  no sensor of a given  type  r mains,  then  the  no-fail  filter 
s t ruc ture  is collapsed to accommodate the loss of that type sensor measurement. 
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The next function of the reconfiguration block is to reinitialize the no-fail filter, 
detectors,  and the l ikelihood ratio computers following the identification of a  failure. 
The reinitialization of the no-fail filter is necessary since undetected sensor failures 
propagate through the no-fail  f i l ter  dynamics to corrupt the state and bias estimates.  
The  reinitialization of the  no-fail  filter  is  performed  by  increasing  the  stimation 
error   covariance by an  amount  reflecting  the  ffect of uncertainty  caused by the  
identified  failure.  This  incremental  covariance is a  function of the  sensor   type,   the  
sensor failure level estimate, and the elapsed time since the hypothesized failure onset 
time. 
For instance,  if a  body  mounted  normal  accelerometer  failure  is  detected,  then 
the  incremental   covariance would  principally  involve  terms  related  to  altitude  and 
normal  velocity. The estimates of the  no-fail  filter  are  not  reinitialized  directly  in 
order   to  minimize t ransients .  The state  stimates  gradually  eliminate  the  ffects of 
the sensor  fa i lure  due t o  the increased estimation error covariance. The initialization 
of detectors  and  likelihood  ratio  computers  after  a  sensor  failure is identical   to  the 
procedure for  s tar t ing a  new detector and estimation residual window. 
2.1.6 Healing Tests 
In order  t o  recover from false alarms associated with modelling errors (e.g. scale 
factor  errors  during  significant  maneuvers),   tests  for  healing of a  failed  sensor  are 
performed after the detection and isolation of a ' failure.  Input sensors are tested for 
healing by comparing their outputs with a sensor of the same type currently used by 
the  no-fail   f i l ter .  This t e s t  is a  binary  hypothesis  test   conditioned  on  the  decision 
rule outcome that the sensor used by the no-fail  f i l ter  is healthy. The recovery of a 
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failed measurement sensor is tested by comparing its output with the estimate of tha t  
sensor  output  provided  by  the  no-fail  filter. Again, this  test  is a binary  hypothesis 
test conditioned on the decision rule outcome that all sensors currently used by the  
no-fail  filter are  healthy. Both input  and  measurement  sensor  tests  are  performed 
only at   he   end of a healing test window, which is constrained  to be an integer 
multiple of the decision residual window length as shown in Figure 4. 
2.2 No-Fail Filter 
In this  section, we  ill present  the  no-fail  filter  algorithm  along with the 
underlying  aircraft  dynamics which the  filter  design is based  on. Our discussion 
begins  in  subsection 2.2.1 with a derivation of the  aircraft  equations of motion and 
the  analytic  relationships  relating  the  no-fail  filter  sensor  outputs  to  the  aircraft 
dynamics. Subsection 2.2.2 contains the implemented  filtering  algorithm. 
2.2.1 Aircraft  Dynamics 
The function of the no-fail  filter  is  to provide  stimates  for  the  aircraft's 
position, velocity and attitude with respect to a ground frame located on the runway. 
As dictated by our application,  the  no-fail  filter  also  provides  normal  operating  blas 
estimates for a selected sensor subset and estimates for horizontal winds. Clearly, the 
degree of analytic redundancy which can be exploited by the  FTS is dependent on the 
choice of underlying  system  dynamics  for  the  no-fail  filter  design. In our  study, we 
have chosen the aircraft point mass equations of motion for the system dynamics and 
a simple "signal plus bias-plus noise" model for the sensor measurements. 
The following frames of reference (definitions can be found in [9]) will be used in 
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our discussion: 
I frame: 
E frame: 
L frame: 
earth centered nonrotating (inertial)  frame 
earth fixed (rotating) frame 
local  level  North,  East, Down (N,E,D) frame located at  A/C center  of 
gravity 
B frame:  body  frame 
G frame:  a  geographic  frame  located  at  the  start of the  a i rport   runway 
Our goal  is first to  describe  aircraft   motion with respect  to  the  G-frame while 
allowing for   the  ear th 's   rotat ion  and  assuming a  locally  flat  earth  in  the  vicinity of 
the  t rminal  rea.   Secondly,  we will re la te   he  sensor   measurements   o   these 
equations of motion. The vector equation for the aircraft acceleration with respect to 
the  G-frame  which is itself  rotating  with  respect  o  the  inertial  frame is given  by 
[9]-[lo]: (referring t o  Figure 3 for frame geometry) 
. .  
rG = TGLCTLB f B  + gLI - 2 n G i G  (2.2.1) 
where capital  subscripts denote coordinatization (i .e.  rG in the r vector coordinatized 
in  the  G-frame). TGL and TLB are  the  transformation  matrices  from  the  L-frame  into 
G-frame  and  from  the  B-frame  into  L-frame  respectively.  The  vector fg  is the   t rue  
specific force which would be measured by an ideal accelerometer in the body frame: 
f B  = Ter ( 'P I  - gI) (2.2.2) 
where g I  is the gravi ta t ional  accelerat ion at  the instrument  locat ion expressed in  the 
inertial   frame, g L  is  the  gravity  field  vector  representing  the  acceleration  from  the 
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combined effects of earth’s gravitational field and the centripetal acceleration defined 
by 
gL = g - TLGQ$@G (2.2.3) 
where pG is  the  position  vector from the  center of ear th   to  A/C center  of gravity 
coordinatized  in  the G-frame. The rotation  matrix fl, is the  skew  symmetric  form  of 
the angular rate vector wG defined by 
wG = TGI [wE,O,O]’ 
where uE is   the  arth’s  rotation  rate (7.27 x rad/sec). 
(2.2.4) 
Modelling the  accelerometer  measurement  inaccuracies by a ”noise  plus  bias” 
type model, we have for the accelerometer measurement output ua 
u, = T B I ( ‘ r I  - gI) + b, + no (2.2.5) 
where b, is the  accelerometer  bias  vector  in  the  body  frame  and n, is  the 
accelerometer  noise  v ctor.  Substituting  the  expression for the  accelerometer 
measurements (eq. (2.2.5)) into equation (2.2.1) for fa.  we get 
(2.2.6) 
Equation 2.2.6 above  r presents  the equations of motion relating  tohe 
accelerometer measurements. The transformation matrices are given in Appendix A. 
The equations  relating  the  rate gyro measurements  to the  Euler  angles  are 
obtained from [lo]: 
e = rw[wB - TB,TLGwGl (2.2.7) 
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where e is the vehicle Euler angles defind by e’=[$,0,+], wB is the true absolute vehicle 
rates vector in the body frame which  would be measured by an ideal rate gyro triad, 
and I?, is the  nonorthogonal  transformation  matrix  relating  the  body  rates  to  the 
Euler  angle  rates. Assuming a “bias  plus  noise” model for  the  rate  gyros  defined by 
u, = w + b, + n, where b, is the   ra te  gyro bias  and n, is  the  associated  noise 
vector,  we get the following kinematics relationship: 
e = rw[uw - TBGwG - b, + n,] (2.2.8) 
We have used the following model for the horizontal winds 
w = Aww + nw (2.2.9) 
where w’ = [wx,w 1’ with wx and w are the horizontal  wind components, nw is a white 
Gaussian  process  noise with covariance Q,. Defining the vehicle state x’ = [ r b r b e ’ , ~ ‘ ]  
and combining eqs. 2.2.1-9 we obtain the following state space description of the  A/C 
point mass equations of motion. 
Y Y 
x(t) = A,x(t) + B,[u(t)-bu] + B:u: + E,n(t) 
where u ’  = [ub,u;J], b’, = [bb,b;J], n‘ = [n; ,n;J,n~] and 
A, = 
0 0  
T~~ O 
O rw 
0 0  
I 
(2.2.10) 
( 2 . 2 . 1 1 )  
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, E, = 
Integrating  this  expression  over  a  sampling  interval of T seconds [ll], the  
following nonlinear discrete-time stochastic difference equation describing the aircraft 
dynamics is obtained: 
x(k+l)=Ax(k) + B(x(k))[u(k)-b,(k)] + u9 + n(k)  (2.2.12) 
where  the  six  dimensional  vectors  u  and b, are  composed of accelerometer and rate 
gyro  measurements,  and  their  associated  biases,  respectively. The vector u 
9 
represents  the  incremental   effect  of the  ear th’s   constant   gravi ta t ional   force  on  the 
system state. The matrices A and B are defined by 
A 
T I  
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
(2 .2.13)  
A, is the  2x2  system matrix associated with the wind  dynamics.  The  3x3  matrix 
TGB is the transformation from the body axes into the G frame [lo], and rW is  the 3x3 
matrix relating the body rates to the Euler angles [ lo] defined in appendix A. 
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The variance, Q, of t he  white noise, n(k), is given by  
O =  r2/2TGBoaT6B  TTGBoaTbB 0 0 
0 0 Truowr; 0 
0 - 0 
(2.2.14) 
where Q, and Q, are the measurement noise variances for the accelerometers and rate 
gyros, and Qw is the process noise variance associated with the  wind dynamics. 
Note that the state transit ion matrix,  A, is  constant.  However, both the process 
noise  variance,  Q(k),  and  the  system  input  matrix, B, are state dependent due to the 
nonlinear  state  dependent  transformation TGB and r,. Now let  us consider  the 
measurement equations for the system described by eqs. (2.2.1)-(2.2.14). Let (xM,yM,zM) 
and  (xE,yE,zE)  be  the  azimuth  and  elevation  antenna  locations  in  the  runway  frame, 
and (rx,r ,r ) be  the A/C position  relative  to  the  runway  expressed  in  the  runway 
frame. Then, the MLS azimuth (yaz), elevation (ye,), and range (yrn) measurements are 
defined by: 
Y Z  
ya,=~in-l [ ( -~y+yu)/razl  + bo, + vaZ (2.2.15) 
Ye,=sin-l[(-rz+z~)/r=,]  + bel + V e l  (2.2.16) 
Y r n  = r,z + b r n  + V r n  (2.2.17) 
where (baz,be, ,brn) and (voz,ve, ,vrn) are biases and measurement noises associated with 
the MLS and raz,  rel  are the aircraft  range from the azimuth and elevation antennas 
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given by: 
(2.2.18) 
(2.2.19) 
Assuming a zero  angle of at tack,  the  airspeed  indicator  output,  y,;, is a noisy 
version of the aircraft velocity with respect to the atmosphere given by: 
Y,, = J(~,-w,)~ + (i Y Y  “w )’ + iz2 + b SP +vsp (2.2.20) 
where (wx,w ) are the horizontal wind components  and b,, and v a re  the  IAS normal 
operating  bias  and  white  measurement  noise. If the  angle of attack  measurement is 
available, then eq. (2.2.20) would be appropriately modified. 
Y SP 
The IMU platform  provides the  Euler  angle  outputs. 
and yaw (y+) angle measurements are modelled via 
Y+ = + + bb + V+ 
ye = 8 + be + Ve 
Y+ = + b+ + V+ 
These  roll  (y+).  pitch (ye), 
(2.2.21) 
(2.2.22) 
(2.2.23) 
where (b+,be,b+) and (V+,Vg,V$) are the biases and white measurement noises associated 
with  platform  outputs. Defining the  measurement  vector, y’=[y,,,y,, ,y,,,y,,,y+,y~,y+], 
t he  system dynamics output becomes 
y(k+ 1) = h(x(k+l)) + by + v(k+ 1) ’ (2.2.24) 
where  by is the  measurement  sensorbias  v ctord fined by 
b; = [b, , ,b, , ,b, , ,bSp,b+,bg,b~] and v is the  measurement  noise  vector  defined  by 
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v’ = [v , , , vaz ,v~ ,  , v sp ,v~ ,v~ ,v~] .  The nonlinear  measurement  function  h(x)  is  defined  by Y 
eqs. (2.2.15)-(2.2.24). In the next section, the no-fail filter which estimates the state 
variables and the normal operating biases of the stochastic nonlinear dynamic system 
described above will be discussed. 
2.2.2 No-Fail Filter 
In this section, we will describe the operation of the  no-fail filter in detail. The 
no-fail filter is an extended Kalman filter estimating the aircraft runway position and 
velocity  attitude  and  horizontal winds along  with the  normal  operating  biases of i t s  
inputs and measurements. The estimator uses either RSDIMU body outputs,  or a set  of 
body mounted accelerometer and rate gyro measurements as its inputs as discussed in 
the overview  section. In the  case of replicated  inputs,  redundant  accelerometer  and 
rate gyro sensors are kept as standby equipment. 
MLS range, azimuth, and elevation sensors, and the IAS provide the measurements 
into  the  filter. If desired, IMU platform  outputs, or RSDIMU computed  attitudes,  can 
also  be included  in  the  measurement  set. For the  case of hardware  redundant 
measurements,  the  no-fail  filter  uses  an  average of the replicated sensor outputs as 
its  measurement. In this way, filter  size  is  kept  to a  minimum, without  loss of 
generality. The no-fail  filter  also  estimates  the  normal  operating  biases of any 
specified subset of the sensor  complement. 
In the  process of obtaining  the EKF used  in  our  study, we have  extended  the 
separate  bias  estimation  algorithms  for  linear  systems  to  nonlinear  systems  via  the 
extended Kalman filter framework. A s  discussed in the overview section, our extension 
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yields a ‘numerical  decomposition  procedure  for  obtaining  the  extended Kalman filter 
gains. We will not  discuss  the  the  details of this  procedure  since  they  were 
adequately covered in the Interim Report [l] and associated papers [6]-[7]. Here, we 
will present the computational structure of the  EKF algorithm for the system dynamics 
described by eqs. (2.2.12)-(2.2.24). 
The  following assumptions  are made in obtaining  the EKF algorithm. The system 
state  and  bias  initial  conditions  are  assumed  to be  zero mean  Gaussian  random 
variables with variances P x ( 0 )  and Pb(0), respectively. In addition,  it  is  assumed  that 
the  measurement  noise  {v(k),k=1,2 ,...[ is a zero  mean,  white  Gaussian  sequence  with 
constant  variance R. Furthermore,  the plant  state  and  bias  initial  conditions, 
measurement  a d  process  noise  sequences  are  allssumed  to  b utually 
uncorrelated. 
In [l], [6]-[?I, it is  hown  that  he EKF equations  for  the  nonlinear  system 
dynamics  described  by  eqs.  (2.2.12)-(2.2.24) will be  given by (dropping  the  functional 
dependence of variables and forming a composite bias vector b as b=[b;,b’]’ 
Y 
? (k+ l )  = AZ(k) + B(?(k))ii(k) + u9 + Kx(k+ l ) r (k+ 1) (2.2.25) 
6 (k+ l )  = 6(k) + Kb(k+l)r(k+l)  (2.2.26) 
where the innovations sequence of the no-fail filter, r(k+l). is given by: 
r ( k + l )  = y(k+l)  - h(z(k+l/k)) - D6(k)  (2.2.27) 
and the bias compensated input vector, b(k), is given by: 
G(k) = u(k) - Bb6(k) (2.2.28) 
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Note t h a t  D6(k) = Ey(k) and Bb6(k) = 6,(k); therefore,  these matrices are defined as 
D = [0 I]. B, = [I 01 if al l   input  and  output  biases  are  estimated. The filter  gain 
par t i t ion,  K,, is defined by: 
K,(k+l) = K,(k+l) + V(k+l)Kb(k+l)  (2.2.29) 
where KO is the "bias-free" filter given, V is  the bias correction matrix and K, is the  
bias  filter  gain. Ko(k+ 1) .  V(k+l)  and Kb(k+  1) are  computed  sequentially  using  the 
l inearized quantit ies:  
F(z(k),G(k)) = A + a B(x(k))u(k) 
a x  G(k) .G(k)  
H(z(k+  l/k)) = 
(k+l/k) 
(2.2.30) 
(2.2.31) 
The expressions for the above partials are given in Appendix A of [I] .  Recursive 
equations for  the "bias-free" gain KO, bias correction matrix V, and the bias gain K, 
are given in Chapter 2 of [ l ] .  
The state  estimation  error  covariance P,(k+l/k),  bias  estimation  error 
covariance Pb(k+  l/k), and  cross  covariance of s ta te   and  bias  PXb(k+l/k)  together 
define  the  prediction  error  covariance  for  the  composite  no-fail   f i l ter .  They a re  
defined by [?I,[ 131: 
P,(k+  l/k)=P,(k+  l/k) + U(k)P,(k)U'(k) (2.2.32) 
(2.2.33) 
(2.2.34) 
with 
[ 
P,(k+ 1/k) P,&+ l /k)  
P(k+l/k)  = 
P;b(k+l/k) pb(k> I 
and where P,(k+l/k) is the prediction error covariance associated with the bias-free 
computations  and V is  the  bias  correction  matrix.  (See  q. 2.23 in  [l]). The matrix 
U(k) is defined as: 
U(k) = F(s(k),G(k))V(k) + B(?(k)) 
(2.2.35) 
(2.2.36) 
Recursive  equations  for these  matrices  are given  i[l]. The innovations 
variance, R,(k+l), can be expressed as: 
R,(k+ 1) = E{r(k+  l)r’(k+ I ) [  
= [Hs(k+l/k)D]  P(k+l/k)  [H(%(k+l/k))D]’ + R (2.2.37) 
In the  next  section,  the  operation of the  detectors ,  which are  driven by the 
expanded innovations of the fail-free filter described above, will be discussed. 
2.3 Detector  Implementation 
In this  section,  the  blocks in  Figure 1 labeled  “residual  computation”  and 
“detectors” will be  xplained. In the  residuals  computation  block,  the  residuals  for 
the  individual  sensors  are  first  computed,  and  then,  the MLS measurement  residuals 
are  filtered  to  compensate  for  colored  noise  in  these  sensor  outputs. The processed 
measurement residuals then drive a bank of detectors, where each detector delivers a 
failure corrected residual to the likelihood ratio computers. Each detector tracks the 
occurrence  and  level of a hypothesized  sensor  failure  and  compensates  the  no-fail 
35 
f i l ter  res iduals  such that  the effects  of the  hypothesized  sensor  failure  are  removed 
from the residuals. 
2.3.1 Expanded  Residuals 
As seen  from  Figure  1,  the  residual  computation  block  receives  as  inputs,  the 
replicated  measurement  sensor  signals  and  the  no-fail  filter 's  estimates  for  the 
averaged  measurements. I t  gives a s  its output  an  expanded  residual  and  inverse of 
the innovations covariance for these expanded residuals.  That is, this block generates 
the  r sidual  sequence  (and  i ts   a sociated  covariance)  which would  have  b en 
generated by the no-fail filter if i t  had used the unreplicated measurements.  
In discussing  these  issues, it is convenient  to  define  sensor ~JJ= to   be  the 
generic type of the sensor measurement of in te res t ,  such  as  MLS azimuth, or body P 
gyro  output,   and  sensor  replication t o  be  the  particular  replication of in te res t  (i.e., 
second  replication of MLS range).  The  replication will be  noted by a  superscript   in 
the text  ( i .e . ,  yAz = first replication of MLS azimuth). 
The residuals for each replicated measurement are formed as follows: 
r ' ( k + l )  = y i ( k + l )  - h(Z(k+l/k))  - Ds(k)  (2.3.1) 
where 
Y = [YA,.Yf, 9 Y  r"'Y **eJY+J&Y+l1 i  i  i i i  (2.3.2) 
The expanded innovations for a dual redundant sensor set are then given by [note: in 
[l] re was referred to  as  ro] 
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I 
r,(k+l) = 
(2.3.3) 
LI 
The innovations variance, R(k+l) (called H k + l )  in [l]), of the expanded residuals 
is found by straightforward substitutions to eq. (2.2.37) as: 
R,&+ 1 )  R,(k+ 1)-R 
R(k+l) = 
R,(k+ 1 ) - R  R,&+ 1 )  1 (2.3.4) 
where R is the measurement noise covariance for each set of replicated measurements, 
respectively.  Equation  (2.3.4)  assumes  that  all  measurement  sensors  are  healthy. If, 
however,  the  jth  sensor  has  been  removed from the EKF, then R(k+l)  must  be 
collapsed by eliminating the jth row and column. 
2.3.2 Treatment of Colored Noise 
As discussed in the Interim Report [l], the failure detection performance of the 
fault  tolerant  system with  colored MLS measurement  noises  severely  degraded  due  to 
false  alarms. This is  to  be  expected,  since  any  time  correlation  in  the  no-fail  filter 
residuals looks like a time-varying  bias  failure  to the  detectors.  Therefore,  it  is 
essential to filter out the correlation in the residuals due t o  the colored MLS noise in 
order  to  have a robust  failure  detection  system. We have  investigated  the following 
methods of treating colored measurement noise in our study: 
I. Estimate MLS noise states in the no-fail filter 
11. Use difference of MLS measurements 
III.Use suboptimal no-fail filter accounting for colored 
IV. Post process MLS residuals to remove colored noise 
noise 
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I) Estimate MLS noise states in the no-fail filter: 
From Section 2.2 eq. (2.2.24) we have for the MLS measurements: 
y i ( k + l )  = h i (x (k+ l ) )  + b iv i (k+ l )   i=1 ,2 ,3  (2.3.5) 
where  {yi,   i=1,2,3)  are  the MLS range,  azimuth,  and elevation  measurements, 
respectively. In the  derivation of the  detector-estimator  algorithms,  the  noises  vi(k), 
were  assumed  to  be  white  Gaussian  sequences. However, these  noises  are,  in  fact, 
time correlated and are generated [3] via: 
v i ( k + l )  = + i v i ( k )  + n i (k )  (2.3.6) 
where  ni(k)   is  a white  Gaussian  sequence. So the  direct  approach would be  to 
augment  the  system  states  with  the MLS noise  states,   vi ,   and  to  estimate  these 
variables  along  with  other  states. The obvious  advantage of this  method is tha t   the  
resulting  filter  residuals would b e  white  and  the  false  alarms would be  greatly 
reduced. The disadvantage of this  technique  is  that  he  numerical  complexity of the 
filtering  al orithms would be  increased  due  to  thigher  order  covariance 
computations  involved.  Since  the  xecution  time of the  filter  algorithm was already 
high, we have decided not to implement this approach. 
11) Use difference of measurements: 
In this  approach  developed  by  Bryson  and  Henrikson  [26],  the  filter  equations 
are driven by the difference of measurements defined by: 
z i ( k + l )  = Yi(k+l )  - (a iyi(k)  (2 .3.7)  
The noises associated with the derived measurements zi(k+ 1) are white. Although the 
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filter  dimension  does  not  increase in this  method,  the  filter  algorithms  become  more 
complicated  due  to  thcorrelation  between  process  and  measurement  noises 
implemented. The extension of this  differencing  scheme  to  the EKF gets  even  more 
complex  due  to  the  linearizations  involved. For instance,  the  measurement  partials 
need  to  be  computed  both  at  the  filtered  state  estimates  and  at  the  predicted  state 
estimate. W e  have  implemented  this  cheme  by  making  some  simplifying  assumptions 
and  found  the  detection  capability of this  technique  to  be  unacceptable. This  was 
largely due to the fact that a bias jump of magnitude m in the measurement yi results 
in a jump sequence defined by: 
~ m , ( l - ~ i ) m . ( l - ~ i ) m . . . . ~  (2.3.8) 
in the  d rived  measurements z i ( k ) .  Therefore,  the  d tectors  had  difficulty in 
estimating the failure magnitude due to the initial spike of magnitude m .  
I11 Use suboptimal filter accounting for colored noise: 
In this  approach  suggested  in [15], suboptimal  filter  gains  are  determined by 
minimizing the  filtering  error  covariance  accounting for the  colored  noise. The 
advantage of this  approach is that  he  f i l ter  dimension  does  not  increase. We have 
derived  the  algorithms  for  this  filter  along  the  lines  presented  in [I51 for colored 
process noise. However, an analytic evaluation revealed that, although this suboptimal 
filter  could  improve  no-fail  filter  estimation  performance, it could not guarantee the 
whiteness of the resulting innovations sequence. 
IV) Post process residuals to remove colored noise: 
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where v^(k) is the  estimate of the  MLS noise  state. The processed  innovations 
r i (k+ l)[r (k+ 1) - +iv^ i(k)]  are  then  used  to  drive  the  bank of detectors.  
The implementation of this  cheme  resulted  in a substantial  reduction  in  the 
false  alarms  associated with  colored MLS noises. The failure  detection  performance  is 
essentially  the  same  as  the  white  noise  case  for  measurement  sensors. However, the 
addition of these  first  order  filters  degraded  the  detection  capability  for  soft  input 
sensor  failures. The insertion of these  first-order  filters  naturally  necessitate 
changes  in the  variance of the  innovations  used by the  detectors,   and  etector 
observation matrices. 
2.3.3 Detectors 
Every detector is driven  by  the  xpanded  residuals  equence of the no-fail 
filter. For each sensor type and replication, there is a specific detector which keeps 
t rack of how a failure in that sensor occurring at the beginning of a decision window 
propagates  through  the  no-fail  filter  dynamics  to affect  the  xpanded  residuals. 
Based  onthis  propagation  effect,  each  detector  estimates  the  level of the 
corresponding  sensor  failure  and  outputs a failure  compensated  residual  sequence 
which is used by the likelihood ratio computers. 
A typical (say, i’th) input sensor detector estimates a postulated bias jump in the  
i’th input at the beginning of a decision window (denoted by time ko) s o  that  the i ’ th  
input  sensor  detector  design is based  on  the following modification of the  system 
dynamics given by eq. (2.2.12): 
x(k+ 1) = Ax(k) + B(x(k))[u(k) - bu] + Bi(x(k))m i (k)  + uQ + n(k)  (2.3.10) 
mi(k+l )=mi(k)  with mi(ko)=mi  and  mi(k)= 0 for  k<ko  (2.3.11) 
where Bi(x(k)) is minus the i’th column of the input matrix B(x(k)) and m i  is the failed 
bias  jump  magnitude of the  i’th  sensor  to  be  stimated. On the  other  hand,  the 
detector for the i’th measurement sensor failure is based on the following modification 
of the measurement equation given by eq. (2.2.26): 
y (k+l )=h(x(k+l ) )  + by + Dimi(k) + v(k+ l )  (2.3.12) 
mi(k+l )=mi(k)  with mi(ko)=mi  and  mi(k O  for  k<ko  (2.3.13)
where m i  is the  failed  bias jump magnitude  for  the  i’th  output  sensor  and D i  is a 
column vector with unity  entry  at  the  i’th row and  zeroes  elsewhere.  It is assumed 
that the failed bias jump magnitudes a re  unknown nonrandom variables. 
As mentioned  previously,  the  detectors  utilize  the  residual of the  no-fail  filter 
as  a measurement equation. In Appendix C of [ l] ,  i t  is  shown that the residual of the 
no-fail filter, in the case of i’th failure hypothesis, can be expressed as: 
r (k+ l )  = Ci(x^(k+l/k))mi + ?(k+l)  (2.3.14) 
where  F(k) is the  innovations of the  no-fail  filter  under  the  no-fail  hypothesis. 
Therefore,  P(k) is approximately a zero mean white  noise  sequence  with  variance 
R(k+l) defined by eq. (2.3.4). Referring back to eq. (2.3.14), P(k+l) would then be the  
measurement  noise  n  h   ’th d tector model and  the  m asurement  matrix 
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Ci(z(k+ l/k)) would be given by (see Appendix C in [ 13 for  the  derivation):  
C i ( z (k+ l /k ) )  = [H(?(k+l/k)) D] B, Vi(k) 
I 1 
+ [H(z(k+l/k) D] (2.3.15) 
In the case of linear systems the relations above, which show the additive effects 
of bias jump failures on the no-fail  f i l ter ,  are exact.  In the nonl inear  case,  they are  
obtained  by  expanding  the  system  nonlinearities  about  the  no-fail  filter  estimate 
under  the  i’ th  hypothesis,   deriving  the  l inearized  f i l tering  error  equations [?I, and 
following the procedure outlined in [l]. 
Note tha t   t he   l e f t  most  matrix  product  in C i  above  shows how the  failure 
propagates  through  the  dynamics  to  affect   the  residuals;   the middle product  depicts 
the  direct   effects of input  failures,   and  the  r ight  most  matrix  i l lustrates  the  direct  
effect of output  failures.   Furthermore,   Bi(e(k)) is zero  in  the  case of measurement 
sensor  failures  and, D i  is zero in the  case of input  sensor  failures.  The  matrix 
Fi(?(k),ii(k)) is defined by: 
Fi(?(k),C(k)) = F(?(k),Ci(k)) 
+ a Bi  (x(k))mi 1 (2.3.16) ax A x (k )  .Gi  ( k )  
Where  F(z(k),C(k)) is given  by  eq.  (2.2.30).  (Note,  for  measurement  sensor  failures 
F i  = F since the failures do not enter through the input weighting matrix B.) 
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The matrix Vi(k) is analogous to the bias correction matrix in the separated EKF 
algorithm [i'] and represents the propagation of a sensor failure, occurring at time k, 
(recall k, i s  the  s ta r t  of the  estimation  residual window), through  the  no-fail  filter 
dynamics. I t  is computed using the following recursive relationship: 
- - 
Vi(k+l )  = AiVi(k) + Bi (2.3.17) 
where Vi(ko) = 0, and; 
The gains K, and K, are  given by eqs.(2.2.29)-(2.2.31). Note that  eq.  (2.3.17)  is 
similar  to  the  recursive  relation  for  the  bias  correction  matrix  recursive  relation in 
the  separated EKF algorithm.  This is to  be  xpected  since Vi(k+l) represents  the 
effect of a sensor  bias  failure  on  the  composite  no-fail  filter  and V(k+l) in  the 
separated EKF represents  the  ffect of a normal  operating  bias on the  bias  free 
portion of the fail free filter. The postulated sensor failure's effect on both state and 
normal operating bias estimates are thus computed. 
Summarizing, the  i ' th  detector  design  isbased  on  the  observation model 
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described  by  eq.  (2.3.14)  and  constant  failure  dynamics. The development  up  to  this 
point  has  assumed  the  value of m i  is known. In reality, m i  is nonrandom,  but 
unknown. Therefore, one must continuously estimate its value. 
The i’th detector estimate, hi (k), of the i’th sensor failure jump, mi(k), can be 
computed by the following first order linear Kalman filter for the case of measurement 
sensor failures, and by a first order approximate nonlinear filter in the case of input 
sensor failures: 
- Ci(k+l .%(k+l/k))Gi(k)]  (2.3.18) 
where the detector estimate Gi(k) is initialized at the start of a residual window with 
iiii(ko)=O.  The detector gain is computed  by: 
G i ( k + l . ~ ( k + l / k ) ) = P i ( k + l / k + l ) C ~ ( k + l , ~ ( k + l / k ) ) R ~ ’ ( k + l )  (2.3.19) 
where Pi(k+ l /k+ 1) is the error covariance of the i‘ th detector bias jump estimate. 
The information  matrix,  Pi-l(k/k), of the  i‘th  detector  is  propagated  recursively 
through: 
P i ” ( k + l / k + l )  = Pi”(k/k) 
+ C;(k+l,f(k+l/k))R”(k+l)Ci(k+l.~(k+l/k)) (2.3.20) 
with 
Pi-’(k,/k,)=O 
That is, the failure bias jump at time k, is assumed to be a zero mean random variable 
with  infinite  covariance (or equivalently,  zero  information). In the  case of output 
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sensor failures, the detector implementation described by eqs. (2.3.18)-(2.3.20) above 
is  an  exact  linear Kalman filter  for  the  hypothesized  failure model  specified by 
eqs. (2.3.10)-(2.3.15). In the  case of input  sensor  failures,  the  detector  becomes  an 
approximate nonlinear filter due to the dependence of F i  in eq. (2.3.16) on the failure 
bias magnitude, m i  where iiii(k) is used in the evaluation of Fi(?(k),ii(k)). 
In summary,  the  detector  block  consists of a bank of first order  estimators 
driven  by  the  expanded  innovations of the no-fail  filter.  Each  detector  corresponds 
to  a different sensor failure hypothesis, and, corresponding to each detector, there is 
an  associated  residual  data window length. The bias jump magnitude for a given 
sensor  failure,  hypothesized  to  happen  at  the  start of the  residual window, is 
estimated by the  detector  corresponding  to  that  sensor. The residuals of the 
detectors along with the residual of the no-fail filter are used in the decision block. 
In the next section, the decision rules used in FINDS will be discussed. 
2.4 Decision R u l e  
As seen  in  Figure 1, the  failure  compensated  residuals from each of the  sensor 
failure  detectors  along with the  expanded  innovations  sequence of the no-fail  filter 
are  used  in  deciding  the  most  likely  failure mode. To arrive  at  his  decision, M-ary 
hypothesis testing, based on a decision residual window, is utilized. 
Tests for isolated, singleton sensor failures will be examined in the next section. 
Tests for multiple failures (two failures occurring at the same instant of time) will be 
discussed in the last section. Currently, tests for multiple failures are only performed 
for MLS azimuth elevation, and range sensors in order to detect antenna failures. 
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2.4.1 Tests for Single Sensor Failures 
Tests for single sensor failures are derived through a multiple hypothesis testing 
formulation. Given M sensor failure models, formulate the following M+l hypotheses: 
H,: r,(k) = P(k) k=k,,k,+l ,..., k,+l, (2.4.1) 
Hi: r,(k) = ?(k) + Ci(z(k/k- l ) )mi  i=1 ,2 ,  ..., M 
where r,(k) is  the  actual  expanded  innovation  sequence of the  no-fail   f i l ter ,  P(k) is 
the innovations sequence of the no-fail filter under no-fail conditions, and 1, is the  
length of the  decision  residual  data window on  which  the  M-ary  hypothesis  test  is 
based.  Recall  from  the  previous  section,  that F(k) is a  zero  mean  white  noise 
sequence  with  variance R(k) defined  by  eq. 2.3.4. The length of the  decision  residual 
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window is, in general, different from the estimation residual data windows described in 
the  previous  section. An M-ary  hypothesis  test will be  used  to  decide  whether  the 
no-fail filter is operating under no failures (hypothesis H,), or under  the i ' th  sensor  
bias jump failure (hypothesis Hi). 
The M-ary hypothesis test, described in detail in [18], minimizes the Bayes risk 
which is a  weighted  cost of making  incorrect  decisions. In the  special   case,  when 
costs associated with  making  wrong  decisions  are  all  equal  and  those of making 
correct  decision  are  zero  ( i .e. ,  Ci  j = l  for ifj  and C i  =O), then  the  optimal  Bayesian 
decision  would  be t o  choose H i  corresponding  to  the  smallest  one of the  M+1 
likelihood ratios A i  given by: 
kd+' d 
k=kd i  
A i  = l  C r ' i (k )   k" (k) r i (k)  - lnPH ;i = O,l, ... m (2 .4.2)  
Stated  ifferently.  the  decision  rule is equivalent  to  choosing  the  hypothesis, Hi, 
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corresponding  to  the  largest a posteriori  probability  conditioned  on  the  residual 
window Y(K). 
The a priori  probabilities, PHi, represent  our  prior  knowledge  about how often 
particular  sensors  fail. In this  tudy,  the a priori  probabilities will be  based  on 
typical  manufacturers  specifications of mean  time  b tween  failures (MTBF). The 
following rule, which  simply converts MTBF (in  hours)  to MTBF in  1/2 a decision 
window, will be applied. 
P = 2*MTBF/(3600*ld*~) 
Hi 
M 
(2.4.3) 
2.4.2 Test for Simultaneous Multiple Failuces 
While the  single  sensor  failure model described  in  the  previous  subsection, may 
be  able to  handle  multiple  failures by viewing them as  a sequence of single  sensor 
failures,  it is not  clear  that  the  fault  tolerant  system  can  decipher  simultaneous 
multiple  failures  without  any  modifications.  These  types of failures  are  specially 
important  for  the MLS measurements  since  an antenna  f ilure would produce a 
simultaneous  multiple  failure  in  th   corresponding MLS measurements. In this 
subsection, a number of possible  additions  to  the  fault  olerant  system  structure, 
which  have  been  analyzed  for  the  testing of multiple  simultaneous  failures, will be 
discussed. 
Recall that  the  previously  discussed  fault  tolerant  system  structure  requires a 
(first order) detector for each sensor utilized by the no-fail filter. Since the no-fail 
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filter  uses  only  one  set of the  redundant  input  sensors  (accelerometers  and  rate 
gyros), multiple failures for input sensors need not be considered. On the other hand, 
because the no-fail filter uses both of the dual redundant measurement sensors, (MLS, 
IAS, IMU measurements),  multiple  failures  for  output  sensors  must  be  taken  into 
account.  Of course,  any  combination of (input or measurement)  sensors would 
consti tute a valid simultaneous failure. Since the number of possible combinations are 
exceedingly  high,  and  since  most  probable  simultaneous  failures  are  due  to MLS 
antenna  malfunctions, we have  decided  to  incorporate  multiple  failure  tests  for MLS 
azimuth,  elevation  and  range  sensors  only.  There  are  basically  three  approaches  one 
can  take  in  dealing with  simultaneous  multiple  failures  within  the  context of the 
existing fault tolerant system structure: 
I. No Modifications 
11. Multiple Failure LR’s 
111. Multiple Failure Detectors and LR’s 
I. No Modifications 
The thought  behind  this  approach is tha t  the  FTS, designed  for  single  failures, 
might be  robust  enough  to detect  multiple  failures  sequentially. This  would be a 
desirable  property,  since  arbitrary  multiple  failures  could  behandled  without 
additional  computational  burden. To investigate  this  avenue we have  xamined  the 
failure detection and isolation performance of the existing FTS under multiple MLS, IAS 
and IMU failures. As one  might  expect,  one  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  he 
posteriori  probabilities  tend  to  converge  to  equal  values  (such  as 1/2 or 1/3) . 
Generally  speaking,  the FTS worked  quite well for  cases  when  the a posteriori 
probabilities  converged  to  values  greater  than 1/3. Multiple failures  were  correctly 
detected  in a sequential  fashion  (decisions  were  one  sampling  interval  part). 
However, since  other  cases  produced  more  unsatisfactory  results, it was clear  that  
this approach was not adequate in general. 
11. Multiple  Failure LR's  
The next  level of complexity would be to  include new LR tests  for  simultaneous 
multiple  failures,  without  adding new detectors  for  these  hypotheses.  Recall from 
eq.(2.3.14) that the LR tests for single failures assume the following failure signature 
models for the no-fail filter residuals: 
ro(k+l )  = Ci(k+l )mi  + ?(k+l )  i = O , l , . . , M  with m o = O  (2.4.4) 
where ro is the residual sequence of the no-fail filter, m i  is the failure level for the 
i ' th sensor,  C i  is the "observation" vector which relates the i'th failure level onto the 
no-fail filter residuals, and P(k+l) is the white noise sequence which would have been 
obtained  for  the  no-fail  filter  residuals if there  were no failures  present (Remember 
that this failure signature model  was derived by linearizing the error dynamics). Since 
the  rror  dynamics  are  linear, if there  were two sensor  failures  (say i and j)  
simultaneously present, then the following failure signature model would result: 
ro (k+ l )  = Ci(k+l )mi  + Cj(k+l)m + ?(k+l)  
j 
(2.4.5) 
where m i  and m are the failure levels for the i ' th and j ' th sensqrs, C i  and C .  are  the 
measurement  vectors  for  the two failure  models  (dependency  has  been  dropped  for 
convenience). Combining the failure levels into a single vector, & the failure signature 
model becomes: 
j 1 
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r,(k+l) = [Ci(k+l) Cj(k+l)]ih + ?(k+l)  (2.4.6) 
i=1,2,  ..., M 
j=1,2, ..., M 
This model is exact for measurement sensors and approximate for input sensors due to 
the  dependence of C i  and C on m i  and m respectively.  That is, when the  i ' th  and 
j'th  sensor  failures  are  considered  simultaneously,  the  linearizations  for  the  input 
j j .  
matrices  can  be  slightly  different  than  the  case in  which the  failures  are  considered 
separately.  For the  valuation of the  LR's ,  we need  their  estimates 6ii and fii One 
approximation is to  use hi and 6 from the  single  sensor  failure  detectors.  Clearly, 
by considering the i'th and j'th sensor simultaneously, estimates for m i  and m.  may be 
improved  by  using a second  order  detector. Using the  stimates from the  single 
sensor  failure  d tectors, we obtain  the following residual,  corrected  for  the 
simultaneous i'th and j'th failure: 
j '  
j 
1 
r .  . ( k + l )  = r,(k+l) - Ci(k+ l )  iiii(k) - Cj(k+l )  iiij(k) 
' J  
(2.4.7) 
So tha t  LR's for the dual sensor failures can be computed by: 
kd+'  d "1 
k=kd I j  
A i  j(r(K)) = 1. r'i j(k)R (k)ri  j(k)-lnPH, (2.4.8) 
i = l ,  ..., M 
j = l ,  ..., M 
where P, is the  a priori  probability of the i and j sensors failing  simultaneously. 
Computational  requirements  for  this  procedure  are  relatively  modest.  Since new LR ' s  
i j  
introduce  only  recursive  scalar  quantities,  the  additional  computations  are  not 
excessive.  Caution  should  be exercised in selecting  the a priori  multiple  failure 
probabilities  because  false  alarms  associated with these  failure models  could  have 
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serious  effects  on  the  system  performance. In this  tudy  the following rule  (which 
assumes independence between failures) is used: 
'H.. = 'Hi * 'H. (2.4.9) 
' J  J 
In addition, to reflect the type of multiple failure expected, we have chosen the 
following form for ii defined in eq. (2.4.6): 
- m = [(mi+mj)/Z , (mi+mj)/2]  (2.4.10) 
111. New Detectors and LR Tests 
In this  approach,  the  same  procedure  is followed as  described  in  the  previous 
section,  except, new second  order  detectors  are  implemented  using  the  failure 
signature models, eq. (2.4.6). for multiple failures. 
These  detectors will estimate m i  and mj, simultaneously. Note that  they will be 
second  order  for  the  dual  failure  case  considered  here. Whlle this  procedure is 
optimal for multiple failures, we believe that the computational benefit to be gained is 
far outwelghed by  the increased computational requirements. 
In conclusion,  after  xamining  the  three  approaches  outlined  above, we've 
adopted  approach 11, modification of the LR's, as a reasonable  method of handling 
multiple failure conditions. 
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2.5 Healing Tests 
An important  aspect of the  developed  fault  tolerant  system is its  ability  to 
monitor  sensors which it has  isolated as "failed", and  to  determine if they  have 
recovered. 
A healing test can be useful for a number of practical reasons. For example, if 
the sensor  only fails intermittently, or i f  unmodeled (normal operating) characteristics 
of the  sensor  manifest  hemselves as moderate  errors  for  short  periods of time, i t  
would  be  useful to  heal  the  sensor  after  the  sensor  recovers or the  transient  has 
passed.  Another  practical  utility of the.se  tests  occurs  when  the FTS incorrectly 
detects  a sensor as  failed (false alarm). 
There  are, of course,  pros  and  cons  to  using  healing  tests  at  all. I t  can  be 
argued that if, for example, a sensor fails with an increased scale factor error then i t  
is only detectable during transient maneuvers and will appear "healthy" otherwise. In 
this case,  the sensor may be correctly detected as "failed",  only to be "healed" once 
the transient has passed. Admittedly, these sor ts  of problems do exist; however, since 
in  this  tudy, we have  adopted simple  models for  the  normal  operational  sensors, 
healing  tests  are a sensible  alternative  toincreased  redundancy or modelling 
complexity.  Moreover,  the FTS maintains a log of all FDI activity,  such  that a sensor 
with a history of chronic problems can be identified and dealt with. 
In our FTS environment, sensors used by the no-fail filter as inputs are treated 
differently  than  those  used as measurements,  when  testing  for  healing. The essential 
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difference is that failed input sensors (body mounted accelerometers and rate gyros) 
are  compared  to  "healthy"  sensors of the  same  type  (with  the  constraint  that  these 
healthy sensors are also being used by the no-fail filter), whereas failed measurement 
sensors can be compared to estimates provided by the no-fail filter. The implications 
of this  difference,  along  with  the  specifics of the  employed  healing  tests, will be 
discussed in the ensuing subsections. 
2.5.1 Test for Input Sensor Recovery 
A likelihood  ratio (LR) t es t  will be  used  to  determine  whether or not  an  input 
sensor,  which has failed and been taken out of the no-fail filter, has recovered. The 
basic idea is to compare the output of a failed sensor with another, like sensor, which 
we assume  is  healthy. The comparison is carried  out  as  the  difference  between  the 
two signals, over a fixed length healing test window of length 1,. Likelihood Ratios a re  
computed  based  on  this  comparison,  along with  information  about  expected  normal 
operating  bias  levels  and  expected  failure  levels.  Discrete  decisions  are  made  at  he 
end of a complete  healing  test window. In other  words, if the  FTS decides  that a 
sensor has failed before the end of a healing window, no healing decision will be made. 
An important constraint imposed by our FTS is that the "healthy" sensor be currently 
used by the  no-fail filter. This is done because only those sensors used by the filter 
are monitored for failures. As a result, standby sensors (not used by the filter), could 
have failed already. 
Here we  will consider the healing test for an arbitrary input sensor. Initially, all 
input  sensors  are  assumed  to  be  working.  Therefore,  there will not  be  any  tests  for 
healing  until  an  input  sensor  actually  fails. To describe  the  healing  mechanism, we 
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begin by making the  following assumptions about the characteristics of a working and 
a failed sensor: 
o "healthy"  sensor  model: 
u i (k )  = ut(k) + b i  + vi(k)  
o "failed" sensor model 
(2.5.1) 
ui(k)  = ut(k) + b i  + vi (k)  + m i  (2.5.2) 
where ut(k) is the " t rue" or  ideal sensor signal, and b i  and vi(k) are the normal 
operating  bias  and  white  gaussian  measurement  noise  associated with the  i-th  input 
sensor  ui(k)  respectively. The term m i  represents a bias  failure of magnitude m i ,  
Suppose an input sensor u l ,  fails and is replaced by a second (standby) input sensor 
of t he  same  type, up. These two signals  can  be  compared by  computing  the following 
difference  signal  over a healing  test window that  is  synchronized  to  the  start of a 
decision window (see Figure 3). 
u(k) = [ ~ p ( k ) - ~ 1  (k)I k=k,+ I,...,k,+l,,  (2.5.3)
A t  the  end of a healing  test window initiated  for  that  input  sensor, we tes t  for  the 
healing of the failed input sensor, u,(k), provided no failures were announced by the 
fault tolerant system. Note that testing is not  performed  at  every  sample,  but  rather 
only a t   he   end  of each  healer window. Defining the following two hypotheses,  and 
incorporating the appropriate sensor/failure models into eq. (2.5.3), we obtain: 
Ho(u, healthy) H,(u,  not  healthy) 
u(k) = b2 - b,+  v2(k)-vl(k)  u(k) = b2-b, -m,  +v2(k)-vl(k) 
= Ab + Av(k) = Am + Av(k) 
where Ab = bp-  bl ,   and Av(k) = v2(k)-  vl(k). If the  variance of the two 
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measurements  are  qual (say ut ) ,  then  v(k) would be a zero  mean  white  Gaussian 
sequence with variance 20:. 
Based  on  the  xpected  value of the  normal  operating  biases, we can  put   the  
following constraints on Ab and Am: 
-P,F Ab 5 P, 
Am < -f ,  or  Am 2 f ,  
where P, and f ,  are expected levels for the' normal operating bias and failure level for 
input  sensor  type  u,  respectively. We can now apply  the  likelihood  ratio  for  this 
composite hypothesis testing problem to get the following decision rule [18]: 
kd+' h  H 
c [Au(k) - EOl2 - [Au(k)- iii ,I2 >:2(2~~3ln7  
k= 1 "0  
where3 6, and G, are   the  maximum likelihood (ML) estimates  under  each  hypothesis 
given by: 
Eo= P, if Aii > 8, 
€io= P, if Aii < -P 
H1 
HO 
'The mathematical symbol 2 i s  defined as f o l l o w s .  given: a 8 b. hypothesis H, i s  
considered  true i f  a > b;  and hypothesis H, is true i f  a < b. 
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where, 
6i1 = Aii if A a f ,  or  Aii 5 - f ,  - 
1 m l =  f ,  if 0 LATI <f ,  
1 m l =  - f u  
For  instance, 
probability of 
if -fu<Aii < 0 
1 
the  choice  for  the  threshold 7 = 5 would  imply tha t   he  a priori 
a failed sensor not healing is 0.95 [18]. 
In summary,  the  input  sensor  healing  test is done  in  batches. The tes t  is only 
performed while the FTS considers a sensor "failed". A t  the  nd of each  complete 
healer window, a likelihood  ratio  test is performed  to  ascertain  whether  the  faulty 
instrument  has  recovered or not. If a decision  indicating  that  the  faulty  sensor  has 
recovered is made, the only action is to change the status flag of that  input sensor to 
standby status. 
2.5.2 Test for Measurement Sensor Recovery 
The recovery of a failed measurement sensor can be detected, as in the case of 
input sensors,  by comparing the output of the failed sensor with that of a sensor of 
the  same  type which is currently  used by the  no-fail  filter. However, another 
possibility is to compare the failed sensor with an estimate of its output provided by 
the  no-fail  filter.  (Note  that  his  procedure is not  possible  for  input  sensors). The 
latter  approach  as  been  adopted  in this  study  since  ithas  the  advantage of 
applicability  even  when a given sensor type is not utilized by the no-fail  filter.  That 
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is, all sensors of a given type have failed and been taken out. 
Let's  consider  the  healing  test  for  an  arbitrary  measurement  sensor.  Suppose 
the  first replication of a particular measurement type, call it Z , ,  has failed and been 
removed  from the  no-fail  f ter. Assuming dual  redundancy,  only  the  s cond 
measurement, Z,, remains  in  the  no-fail  measurements. To mimic the  input  healing 
tes t  the following residual over the healing test window is computed: 
AZ(k) = Zl(k) - Z(k/k-1) 
-. 
k=kd+1,kd+2 , . . . ,  kd+lh  (2.5.4) 
Here  it is assumed  that  he  normal  operating  biases  for  the two measurements  are 
similar. Where h(z(k/k-l)) above is the estimate of Z(k)  provided  by the no-fail EKF. 
and  6(k)  is  the  no-fail  filter  bias  estimate. We then  have  the two hypotheses  (after 
substituting eq. (2.2.24)): 
H,(Z healthy) 
AZ = h(x(k)) - h(Z(k/k-l))  
+ b - 6, = ?(k) 
H, (Z ,  not healthy) 
AZ = m l  + ?(k) 
where ml)fZ or m 1  5 - fZ 
Under  hypothesis H,. ?(k) would be  a white  Gaussian  sequence with zero  mean 
and  variance, u , given  by the  appropriate  diagonal  entry  of  the  residual  variance 
matrix of the no-fail filter. 
2 
2 
The LR tes t  can now be  applied  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  input  healing  test. 
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The ML estimate for ml  would be given by: 
- 
if AZ 5 - fZ or  AZ 2 f Z  - 
i$ = + f Z  if o 5 ai < f Z  
- 
A ml = - fZ  if  - fZ< AZ<O 
SO that the composite hypothesis test for this problem becomes: 
If a  measurement  sensor  bias  is  estimated,  under H,, t h e r e  will be  anormal 
operating  bias  mean  in  the  residuals.  In this   case,   under  H,, residuals  can  be 
computed as: 
u 
AZ(k) = b + O(k), where -8, 5 b 5 p, 
N 
where, 
Kd+'  h 
K=Kd+l 
c j[Z(k)-6,I2 - [Z(k)-6il]21 2 H1 20,ln7 
HO 
In summary,  when  an  output  sensor  fails  and is removed  from  the  no-fail  filter 
measurement  set ,   i ts   output is compared  with  an  estimate  provided  by  the  no-fail 
filter. The LR computation  generates a  maximum likelihood  estimate  for  the  normal 
operating  bias  and  failure  level. The composite hypothesis test is done at the end of 
every  complete  healing  test window. If the  test   indicates  that   the  sensor  has 
recovered, the measurement is incorporated  back  into  the  no-fail  filter  measurement 
set .  
2.6 Reinitialization Procedure 
Fault  tolerant  systems  in which analytic  failure  detection  and  isolation (FDI) 
techniques  are  used  on-line  to  identify  system  failures  usually  require some  level of 
compensation  in  order  to remove the  accumulated  effects of the  detected  failure  on 
the  system. In the developed FTS. sensor  failures  (especially  input  failures,  and  soft 
measurement  failures)  have  to  propagate  through  the  no-fail  filter  dynamics  (until a 
significant  residual  signature is generated)  in  order  to  be  detected.  Therefore,  the 
no-fail  filter  must  be  reinitialized  in  order  to  remove  the  accumulated  effects of the 
detected  failure  on  the  filter. In addition,  the  no-fail  filter  must  be  restructured 
after  the  isolation of a failure  to  account  for  the  loss of a sensor  input o r  
measurement. 
There are -a number of ways in which reinitialization can be accomplished within 
our  framework  (see [ 2 9 ] ) .  For instance,  the  measurements  can  be  reprocessed if the 
failure  onset  time  can  be  stimated  accurately. In our  problem,  however,the  xact 
failure  time  is  not  estimated  since a fixed  length window of measurements are used.4 
4The  procedure  for  finding  the  exact  failure  times is described in [13] and  involves  using 
a set of moving  windows  corresponding to different  failure  detection  times. 
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A second problem with this strategy is the additional requirement of saving the past 
measurements for the moving windows. Finally, re-running of the no-fail filter with a 
previous set of measurements, generally, cannot be done in real time. 
Another  method  involves  resetting  the  no-fail  f ter  state  estimate  and 
covariance  using  the  same  procedure followed  in setting  the  initial  evels  for  these 
variables. The  drawback of this procedure is its neglect of the  information  embedded 
in the failure decision logic and associated failure level estimates. 
If the failure level estimates provided by the detectors can be trusted,  then the 
no-fail filter state estimate can be corrected by adding an appropriate increment due 
to  the  detected  failure  as  uggested in [27]. The no-fail  filter  covariance  is also 
incremented  in  this  procedure by  using the  covariance  associated with the  failure 
level  estimate.  Although  the  failure  level  estimates  provided  by  the  detectors  usually 
provide a reliable  failure  direction,  the  magnitude of the  failure  level  estimates  are 
not  usually  very  accurate  due  to  the  uncertainty  associated with failure  onset time 
and detector settling time. Moreover,. in  some applications, it is not desirable to have 
step changes in the plant state estimates due to the transients produced, in devices 
which use these estimates as inputs. 
These  drawbacks  associated with the  reinitialization  procedures  above  can  be 
minimized by resetting  only  the  covariance of the  no-fail  filter. In this  method,  the 
appropriate  increment of t he  no-fail  filter  covariance is found  by  computing  the 
conditional  covariance of the  no-fail  f ter  state  estimate  condltioned  on  the 
observation sequence under the detected failure mode. 
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Finally,  the  last  possibility  is  the  weighting of the  no-fail  filter  state  and 
detector  failure  level  estimates  by  the a posteriori  probabilities. In this  technique, 
instead of the  hard  switching  produced by a decision  rule,  the a posteriori 
probabilities provide a soft switching between the failure modes. 
The reinitialization  methods  discussed  above  can  be  grouped  into  the following 
categories: 
o Reprocess  Measurements 
o Reinitialize  (Estimate  and)  Covariance 
o Reset  Estimate  and  Increment  Covariance 
o Conditional  Covariance 
o A Posteriori Probability Weighting 
In our study, we have  compared  only  the  second,  third  and  fourth  approaches which 
are described next. 
I)  Reinitialize  (Estimate  and)  Covariance: In this  approach,  the  no-fail  filter 
covariance  parameters  are  set  to  the  values  used  as  initial  conditions. The s ta te  
estimate is be reinitialized by following the procedure employed in selecting the plant 
state  estimate  initial  conditions.  Naturally,  this approach  generates  transients 
associated with the  settling of the  filter  gains  imilar  to  that  encountered  in  the 
initial stage of the problem. 
11) Reset Estimate and Increment Covariance: In the case of an i’th failure mode 
decision, the no-fail filter state estimate would be reset to [24]: 
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where '(k) is   the   s ta te   es t imate  from the  no-fail  filter  (eq. (2.2.25)),  Vi(k) is the  
failure correction matrix for the i ' th failure mode (eq. (2.3.17)), and iiii(k) is  the i ' th  
failure  state  st imate  (eq.  (2.3.18)) provided  by  the  i ' th  detector.  When the   s t a t e  
estimate is reset  according to  the procedure above,  then the corresponding predict ion 
error covariance is given by: 
EIZi(k+l/k)"x;(k+l/k)/Hi] = P(k+l /k)  + Ui(k)Pi(k)U;(k) (2.6.2) 
where Zi(k+  l,/k) is   the   s ingle   s tage  predict ion  error   associated  with  the  es t imate ,  
x^i(k), given by 
Zi(k+l /k )  = x ( k + l )  - x^i(k+l/k) 
or,  rearranging eq. (2.6.3) 
Z i (k+ l /k )  = A[?(k) + Vi(k)iiii(k)] + Biiiii(k) 
(2.6.3) 
(2.6.4) 
= G ( k )  + [AVi(k) + Bi]iii(k) 
= ?(k+  l/k) + Ui(k)iiii (k) 
where Ui(k)=AVi(k)+Bi,   P,(k+l/k) is   the  prediction  error  covariance of the  no-fail 
f i l ter ,  and P i ( k )  is  the prediction error covariance of the i ' th detector.  Therefore,  the 
prediction  error  covariance of the  no-fail  filter  can  be  incremented  by  the  second 
term  on  the  r ight  hand  side of eq. (2.6.2) above if the   s ta te   s t imate   i s  rese t  
according to  eq.  (2.6.4). 
The state estimate  above  is  the  optimal  (least  mean  square  sense)  estimate 
conditioned  on  the  i ' th  failure mode provided that the  failure  onset  ime  and  the 
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failure  state  initial  statistics  correspond  to  those of the  actual  failure. However, in 
practical  applications  such  as ours, the  failure  onset  time  cannot  be  accurately 
estimated  due  to  the  necessity of using a bounded  set of detectors as opposed to a 
growing  number  equired  by a fully  optimal  decision  rule.  Moreover,  sudden  changes 
in  the  state  estimates would not  be  desirable  due  to  their  effects  on  the  automated 
landing and control laws. 
111) Conditional  Covariance: To reduce  the  transient  effects  produced by the 
previous method, the no-fail filter can be reinitialized by incrementing only the error 
covariance by an  appropriate  amount following the  isolation of a failure. In this 
manner, the state estimation e r r o r  il l  .>e no-fail filter can be compensated gradually. 
In this procedure, the appropriate covarlance to be used is the conditional covariance 
of the no-fail  filter  conditioned on the  given  observations  under  the  decided  failure 
mode. In other  words, we need  to  c mpute E[%(k+l/k)%(k+l/k)/Y(k),Hi] where 
%(k+l/k) is the  prediction  error of the no-fail  filter  defined  by
%(k+l/k)=x(k+l)-z(k+l/k). Since  the  single  stage  prediction of the no-fail  filter  can 
be expressed by (adding and subtracting the term Vi(k)fii(k) to  the R.H.S.)  
?,(k+l/k) = x(k+l) - [?(k+l /k)  + Ui(k)Gi(k)] + Ui(k)fii(k) 
= x(k+l )  - x^i(k+l/k) + Ui(k)Gi(k) (2.6.5) 
= "xi(k+l/k) + Ui(k)Gi(k) 
we have 
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$(k+l/k)?o(k+l/k) = zi(k+l /k)Ti(k+l /k)  
+ [gi (k+  l/k)G; (k)U; (k) + U (k)iiii (k)?;(k+ l)]  
+ U (k)iiii (k)iiii Ui (k)  (2.6.6) 
Taking the  conditional  expectation, given the  observation  sequence Y(k) and  the 
hypothesis Hi, of both sides above, we get 
E[~,(k+l/k)%~(k+  l /k)/Y(k),Hi] 
= E([~i(k+l /k)%'i(k+l /k) /Y(k) .Hi]  + Ui(k)iiii(k)$i(k)U'i(k)[ (2.6.7) 
The  middle term in eq. (2.6.6) vanishes because E[%i(k+l/k)/Y(k),Hi]= 0 and the 
last  term  can  be  taken  out of the  conditional  expectation  sign. From the  properties 
of the conditional expectation for  Gaussian random variables (Proposition 3 on p.  246 
in  [28]),  the Y(k) dependence of the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side of eq. 
(2.6.7) can be taken out so that using eq. (2.6.2) we get 
E[%,(k+l/k)?,(k+l/k)/Y(k),Hi] = P,(k+l/k) + Ui(k)Pi(k)U;(k) 
+ Ui(k)iiii(k)$i(k)U;(k)  (2.6.8  
Therefore,. the no-fail filter covariance can be lncremented by the last  two terms in 
the equation above. The last term represents the uncertainty due to the accumulated 
error  in  the  no-fail  filter  arising from the  failure. The preceding  term  signifies  the 
uncertainty  associated with the  estimation of the  failure  state. In this  method,  the 
accumulated  effects of the  failure  on  the  no-fail  filter  state  estimate  are  not  taken 
out; however, the additional uncertainty added to the no-fail filter covariance reflects 
the  error accumulation due to the detected failure mode. 
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Each of the  three  approaches  outlined  above  can, in principle,  provide  an 
estimate  for  the  reinitialization  “direction”  and  magnitude  after  the  detection  and 
isolation of a failure. The failure  directions  (provided by the  estimate  and/or 
covariance increment) can be used to selectively reinitialize those parts of the  no-fail 
filter affected by the failure. The magnitude of the reset can be scaled to reflect any 
inherent uncertainty about i t .  In this way,  a slightly  stiffer  reset  can  be  generated, 
a s  a conservative  measure. Our fault  tolerant  system  uses Method 111. (conditional 
covariance) for resetting the no-fail filter. 
2.7 Failure Signature -- An Example 
In this  ection  an example  problem will be analyzed  in  an  attempt  o  better 
understand the failure signature information seen by the detectors.  In the context of 
this  example,  the  failure  signature of bias,  ramp  and  null  failures  on  no-fail  filter 
residuals will be discussed. Moreover, the inherent difference in detectability between 
the  input  and  measurement  sensors  and  the  distinguishability of various  sensor 
failures will be apparent by analyzing this simple example. 
The example chosen is a specxal case of our problem involving scalar position, x, 
velocity  v,  and  acceleration  variables  without  nonlinear  coordinate  transformations. 
Within this framework, consider the second-order system 
x (k+ l )  = x(k) + Tv(k) 
v(k+l )  = v(k) + ra,(k) + n,(k) (2.7.1) 
where T is   the  sampling  interval  and  the  sensor  measurements x,,  v, and 8, are  
defined by 
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(2.7.2) x,(k+ 1) = x(k+  1) + nx(k+l )  
v,(k+l) = v(k+l )  + nv(k+l )  
a,(k+l) = a ( k + l )  + n,(k+l) 
The measurement  noises  n,,nv,  and n x  a re  white  Gaussian  sequences  with  known 
statist ics.  For ease of presentation, assume that the no-fail filter is implemented with 
constant gains by: 
% ( k + l )  = Z(k) + TG(k) + kxxrx (k+ l )  + kxvrv (k+ l )  (2.7.3) 
v^(k+l) = ?(k) +Ta,(k) + kvxrx (k+ l )  + k v v r v ( k + l )  
where  kx,,kxv,kvx  and kVV are   the no-fail  filter  gains  and  the  measurement  residual 
sequences rx  and rv a r e  defined by: 
r x ( k + l )  = x, (k+l )  - [ji(k) + ~ ? ( k ) ]  (2.7.4) 
rv(k+ 1) =v,(k+l) - [?(k) + ~a,(k)] 
We will  now analyze the failure signature induced by a bias failure jump in each 
of these  three  sensors .  Using the  xpression for  the  failure  correction  matrix,  eq. 
(2.3.17) we get  the following recursive  relation  for V x  (i.e..  the  failure  correction 
matrix for the position sensor failure) 
[' "kxx 
Vx(km) = 
-TkVx + 1 -kvv (2.7.5) 
Using the expression above and the one for the failure measurement matrix, eq. 
(2.3.15) we get the following failure signature mean for two samples in the position and 
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velocity' measurement residuals for a bias jump m, a t  time k,: 
(2.7.6) 
As seen  above, a position  sensor  bias  failure  induces a jump in  position 
measurement  (with a level  equal  to the  failure  magnitude)  and  one  sample  later 
induces a jump in the velocity sensor with a level scaled by the no-fail filter gain kvV. 
Based  on  this  observation,  several simple tests  for  position  sensor  failures  can  be 
posed. For instance,  we can evaluate, on-line, the statistic 
r(k,+ 1) = (rx(ko) + rv(ko+l) /kvx)/z  (2.7.7) 
to estimate the position sensor failure level m, 
E[?&,+ 1)l = m x  
These  types of open-loop  generated  statistics would be  susceptible  to  accumulated 
errors .  The detectors  described in the  previous  ection  use  the  failure  signature 
information  above  in  an  optimal  closed-loop  manner  (accounting  for  noise  statistics 
and  dynamics)  to  estimate  the  failure  levels. Similarly,  for a bias jump failure  in  the 
velocity  sensor vm with  magnitude m V ,  a t  time k,, we have  the following signature  on 
the residuals: 
E[r,(k,)l = 0 ; E[rv(k,)l = m v  (2.7.8) 
E[r,(k,+l)] = - ( l+r)kxvmv ; E[r,(k,+l)] = ( 1-kvv)mv 
On the other  hand,  a bias jump failure in the accelerometer sensor a,,, with magnitude 
m, a t  time k, induces the following signature mean  time history  on  the  measurement 
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residuals: 
E[r,(k,)] = 0 ; E[rv(ko)] = 0 
E[r,(k,+l)] = 0 ; E[r,(k,+l)]=-ma 
(2.7.9) 
Comparison of the input sensor (accelerometer) failure signature above with tha t  
measurement of sensors  (position  and  velocity)  shows  the  inherent  delay  in  failure 
signature  generation  for  input  sensors. This is because  an  input  sensor  failure  must 
propagate  through  the  no-fail  filter  dynamics  in  order  to  generate  failure  signature 
on the measurement residuals. We also note the similarity of the signatures generated 
by  accelerometer  and  velocity  sensor  failures. For instance,  an  accelerometer  bias 
failure with  level ma  looks  like a velocity  sensor  failure with failure  level - ma.  
Moreover, if  we had  the  unfortunate  choice for no-fail  filter  gains  uch  that  he 
relations 
-(l+T)kXV(-Tma) = (kXVT+(kVV-1)T2)ma 
(l-kvv)(-Tma) = (k,-2T)ma (2.7.10) 
were  approximately  satisfied  (choosing k,, = ./(I-.) and  kXv=kvv- 1 would exactly 
satisfy  them),  then  it would be  impossible to  distinguish  between  the  velocity  and 
accelerometer  failures by  looking at  his  failure  signature  time  history. This  imple 
example  clearly  shows how the  choice of no-fail  filter  gains  affect  the
distinguishability of various  ensor  failures. In this  case,  the  next  sample of the 
failure  signatures  involving  terms  including  the  gains k,, and k,, would provide  the 
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necessary distinguishability information. 
We also  note  that  the  residual  signatures will eventually  converge  to finite 
steady-state  values  ince  the  recursive  relation  for  the  failure  correction  matrix 
given by eq. (2.7.5) is governed by the stable closed-loop filter transition matrix. 
Although we have modelled sensor failures as bias jumps, other types of failures 
also  manifest  themselves  approximately  as  time  varying  biases. For instance, consider 
a ramp  failure  in  position  sensor,  at  ime k, with  level s x  (kfk,). In this  case,  the 
induced failure signature would be given by (using the expression for the time-varying 
failure levels in [15]): 
E[rx(k,)] = 0 ; E[r,,(k,)] = 0 
E[rx(ko+l)] = S,T ; E[rv(k,+l)] = 0 
E[r,(k,+B)] = (2-k,,-7kV,)s, ; E[rv(k,+2)] = kV,sx? 
A hardover failure in position sensor at time k, with a level of h, will approximately 
result in the following failure signature: 
'(2.7.11) 
(2.7.12) 
~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ o + ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ - k , , - ~ ~ v x ~ ~ x - ~ ~ ~ , ~  ; E[rv(k,)l = k ,(h,-%(k,)) 
where ?(k,) = E[x(k,)] and  assuming  %(ko) = Z(k,+l).  These  relations follow since a 
position sensor failure with  level  h, a t  time k, is approximately equivalent to a bias 
failure with level hx-%(k,). 
Similarly, a null failure in the velocity sensor at time k, will approximately result 
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in the  following failure signature mean time history: 
(2.7.13) 
where it is assumed that V(k,) = V(k,+l). These relations follow since a null failure in 
the velocity sensor at time k, is approximately equivalent to a bias failure with  level 
-V(ko). 
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3. FTS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this  chapter  estimation  and  failure  detection  performance of the  developed 
integrated avionics sensor fault tolerant system will be discussed. The discussions will 
be  centered  around  specific  simulation  runs, which  point  out  characteristic  traits of 
the  FTS, rather than ensemble statistics (although the simulation was carried out in a 
Monte Carlo  fashion). The computer  program  used  for  these  simulations is called 
FINDS and is documented  in [2]. Current  performance of the FTS will be  empirically 
examined in this chapter with regard to: 
o Reliability of no-fail filter state estimates, i.e. "fault tolerance" 
o Speed of detection  and  isolation. 
o Failure distinguishability between dynamically related sensors 
o Robustness of the  method for detection of non-bias failures. 
o Use of navigation  quality RSDIMU in  lieu of flight  quality  body  mounted 
accelerometers, rate gyros, and platform IMU. 
The organization of the chapter 1s as follows: Section 3.1 outlines the format and 
goals of the  simulation  study.  Its two subsections  help  the  reader  understand  the 
1,ater results by detailing  the  simulation  parameters  used,  and  the  performance 
measures which will be employed,  respectively.  Typical FTS performance  when  failures 
are not simulated can be found in Section 3 . 2  along with a description of the nominal 
FTS parameters used in the study. The next section, 3 . 3 ,  discusses performance under 
singleton and simultaneous multiple bias failures. Bias failure performance is reported 
in this section for both a "standard" (flight control quality) sensor configuration, and 
an RSDIMU configuration  (navigation & flight  control  quality  sensors).  Section 3.4 
shows how well the  FTS works with non-bias type failures. Finally, the chapter closes 
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with  Section 3.5 which  summarizes  the  results of the   chapter   and  gives an  overall 
evaluation of the current system. 
3.1 FTS Evaluation-Overview 
A simulation study was performed to empirically determine the capabilities of the 
analytically  derived  fault  tolerant  system,  developed  in Chapter 2. The study  had 
several goals - some of which  were  mentioned  in the previous section. Here we would 
like  to review  the  ground  rules  for  this  study,  discuss  the  simulation  and  filter 
parameters used, and the performance measures to be employed. 
The simulation environment used to test the developed FTS is provided by NASA’s 
six degree of freedom  nonlinear  digital  simulation of the TSRV research aircraft .  The 
original  program  (supplied by NASA.-LRC) was suitably modified to  include  realistic 
sensor  and  failure  models  (see [ 2 ] ) .  Our simulation  study  uses  this  program  in  the 
terminal  area - under MLS coverage  only.  Moreover,  the  fault  tolerant  estimates 
generated by the  no-fail  filter  are  used by a fully  automatic  landing  system - in a 
closed loop fashion - t o  land  the  aircraft  along a prescribed  path.  Therefore, our 
simulation  study is concerned with detecting  and  isolating  failures in sensors  and 
providing fault tolerant aircraft state estimates to the automatic landing system in the 
terminal  area. I t  is  assumed  that  the  reader  is familiar  with  this  problem (from 
reading 113, [2], 141, [SI, or [si). 
The simulation study was performed by: 
o implementing the  system  described  in  Chapter 2 - making little  or no 
simplifying assumptions. 
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o using an update rate for all  portions of the FTS  of 20 Hz (i.e. a sample time 
of 0.05 seconds). 
o simulating  the  normal  operating  characteristics of the  sensors  (i.e.,   bias, 
noise, scale factor, misalignment, etc.) - while using a simple bias plus noise 
model in designing the FTS. 
o simulating  the many failure  modes  for  the  sensors  (i.e.,  bias  null,  hardover, 
ramp,  increased  noise,  etc.) - while using a simple  bias jump failure model 
in designing the FTS. 
o estimating  only  selective  normal  operating  biases - even  though  all  sensors 
have some form of constant bias term in their outputs. 
o simulating  failures  in  the  components of the RSDIMU (when  used)  are  not 
detected by the  FTS, nor  are  they  considered  in  this  study - instead  the 
FDI techniques  resident  in  the RSDIMU are  used  (see [23] for a description 
of these techniques). 
These  rules  were  adopted  in  order  to  evaluate  the  robustness of the FTS under 
simple internal models. Simplifying assumptions  (even  straightforward  ones)  were  not 
made so that assumptions about one mode of operation (say with  bias  failures) would 
not impact performance under another (for example, with increased noise failures). In 
this way, the  robustness of the  original  method would be  xamined ra ther   than   an  
unintended  specialized  variant of i t .  Moreover,  bypostponing  these  practical 
decisions they could then be made based on a broad experience base. 
In addition  to  the  basic  rules given  above, the  particular  uns  chosen  to  be 
included in the study had the following general characteristics: 
o Multiple isolated  failures  were  simulated  in  each  run  to  save  on  computer 
resources,  and  to  see if detectability of the  remaining  sensors would be 
affected. 
o A bias  failure was simulated  for  every  sensor  at several  points  in the 
standard  flight  trajectory  (for  example,  along a perpendicular  path  as well 
a s  a tangential path relative to the runway; or on a straight and level path, 
as  well a s  a maneuvering one). 
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o Failures were randomized with respect to 
. time of failure 
. level of failure 
. sensor  eplication 
o Each  run was made  in a Monte Carlo  fashion - in  that  a different  random 
seed was used for every run (therefore, filter initial conditions, bias levels, 
noise  time  histories,  etc.  were  all  randomized). 
The  Monte Carlo  simulation  approach was used  to  more  faithfully  test  he FTS 
and  explore  the  strengths  and  shortcomings of i t .  I t  also  provides a good base of 
runs which can  be  incorporated with future  ones  to btain  average  performance 
measures,  and  probabilities. By simulating  failures  at  varlous  points  within  the  flight 
path,  we can empirically examine the effects of flight path on failure identifiability and 
detectability. 
The next  subsection  defines  the  nominal  simulation  used  throughout  this  study. 
I t  also displays the nominal flight path along with other important flight profiles. 
3.1.1 Simulation  Description 
The objective of this sub-section is to define the simulation parameters used in 
the study and to describe the nominal simulation environment - as it effects the FTS. 
The simulation  runs all start  slightly  before  the  point of transition  to MLS 
coverage and end at touchdown on the runway. Sampling frequency for the simulation 
is 20 Hz. Figures 5-9 show the  simulated  aircraft   state time  histories  for a typical 
simulation  run.  These  figures  are  intended  to  be  used  for  reference  purposes. In the 
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res t  of the  simulation  runs  to  be  presented,  these  time-histories will not  be  re- 
shown. They  may, in fact ,  be slightly different, since the no-fail filter state estimates 
are  used by the  automatic  guidance  and  control laws to  land  the  aircraft. In other 
words,  under  different  noise, wind, failure,  etc.  conditions,  the  corresponding  true 
variable time-histories may differ somewhat from the nominal. 
Figure 5 shows the A/C ground  track  and  altitude  profile. This figure  clearly 
shows the sequencing of the various flight segments as the A/C performs its automatic 
approach  and  landing. In addition,  the  direction of the  simulated  horizontal wind 
(165 degrees from north)  is displayed. The magnitude of the  wind  was a constant 
30 knots  in  all  sample  runs  considered in this  tudy. The simulation  runs  all  start 
under VORTAC system  coverage  without  the FTS. At approximately 35 seconds, MLS 
coverage begins and the FTS program (no-fail filter, bank of detectors, decision logic, 
e tc . )  is initiated.  Figure 5 shows the  initial  ground  track  oriented  roughly 45O 
relative to the runway. A banking  maneuver is executed (from 55-100 seconds) which 
brings  the  flight  track  perpendicular  to  the  runway. A second  bank  maneuver  occurs 
30-40 seconds  thereafter which aligns  the  flight  rack with the  runway. This flight 
segment  runs to  approxlmately 215 seconds. Glide slope  capture  occurs  at 
approximately 180 seconds. Between 255 seconds  and  touchdown  (approximately 275 
seconds), decrab and flare maneuvers are executed. Also, MLS elevatlon  measurements 
are replaced by  altimeter  measurements  in  the FTS at  around 260 seconds. The flight 
path can be summarized by the following mapping (which will be convenient to refer to 
in later discussions): 
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o t ime - 35->55; A/C pa th  i s  ne i ther   perpendicular  
n o r   p o r o l l e l   t o  runway 
o t ime = 55->100. k 136->200; 
o t ime = 108->130; 
o t ime = 200”>touchdown; 
A/C i s  maneuvering 
A/C pa th   i s   perpendicu lar   to  runway 
A/C p a t h   i s   p a r a l l e l   t o  runway 
The altitude profile curve shows the nearly constant sink rate of approximately 3 
meters/s. 
The maneuvers, shown in the ground track of figure 5 can be seen in more detail 
in the next four figures. The corresponding attitude and body attitude rate variations 
for this  typical  simulation  run  are  displayed in  figure 7 and 6, respectively. The 
following attr ibutes are evident in these figures: 
Yaw angle has the largest amplitude range, and the lowest frequency content 
(i.e. changes occur more gradually and smoothly) 
Pitch  angle  has  the  smallest  amplitude  range - and is also  fairly  smooth, 
with some regulation evident during the roll angle transient. 
The  roll  angle  profile  shows  the most variations. I t  also  contains  everal 
periods where the roll angle is very nearly zero. 
All th ree  body att i tude rates are plotted using the same scale. 
Roll rate has the largest  and sharpest  transients,  but the duration of each 
is typically confined to a 5-20 second period. 
Yaw ra te ,  on the other hand, is smooth, but its duration a t  significant levels 
is much longer (30-70 seconds). 
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The implications of these variations are as follows: 
o The effects of these  att i tude  rate  variations  on  the FTS will be  felt  as 
unmodeled  errors  due  to  misalignment,  and  scale  factor  errors - each of 
which is a function of the signal level. 
o Both attitude  and  attitude  rate  profiles  clearly show periods of large  and 
small  signal  evels. The detectability of failures of varying  types  and  levels 
during these periods is an important issue. 
Typical  body  acceleration  profiles  experienced  by  the  aircraft  are  found  in 
figure 8. All three trajectories are plotted on the  same  relative  scale - s o  that they 
can  be  compared.  Notice,  however,  that  the  vertical  acceleration is biased by the 
gravitational  acceleration.  Basically,  these  curves  show  the  aircraft  decelerating  as  it 
nears touchdown. The affects of cross-axis coupling on the lateral airframe dynamics 
can be seen in the lateral acceleration curve. Since body accelerometer measurements 
are  inputs  to the FTS, and  since  they  include  both  scale  factor  and  mounting 
misalignment errors, the absolute level of each of these curves should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the later results.  
Since the FTS operates in a runway based coordinate frame, the mapping between 
body  quantities  and  runway  quantities is important  since  this  transformation  effects 
failure  observability.  Figure 9 shows the A/C velocity  components  in  the  runway 
frame. I t  can  also  be viewed as  the  transformation of the body  accelerations 
(properly  integrated)  into  the  runway  frame. Note in particular,  the  flight  segments 
where  the  forward  body  velocity is either  all  in  the x or y runway  direction. During 
these  periods,  not  only  the  signal,  but  also much of the modeling errors  will be 
polarized in these directions. 
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Table 1 shows the sensor  model parameter values used in the simulation. A dual, 
redundant, sensor configuration is used. For each sensor type, the standard deviation 
of the  sensor  measurement  noise,  normal  operating  bias  and  scale  factor  error is 
given,  along  with the  associated  stop limits. The units  for  the  parameter  values  are 
given in the second column - except for scale factor which is expressed as a percent,  
and IAS measurement  noise,  which is multiplicative,  and  also  expressed  as a percent.  
As discussed earlier, MLS measurement noises are time-correlated with a steady-state 
rms  value  sp cified  n  Table 1. Furthermore,  body-mounted  instruments  are 
misaligned  with  respect  to  the  body  axis  through a random  transformation. The 
standard  deviation of the  random  misalignment is 0.4' for rate  gyros  and 0.36' for  
accelerometers. The normal sensor model parameters values for the RSDIMU, when it  1s 
used, is shown in Table 2. 
3.1.2 Performance  Measures 
The performance of the FINDS program  has  been  determined by making  various 
runs  under  the following sensor  failure  conditions,  listed in  approximate  order of 
increasing deviation from the underlying the FTS design assumptions: 
o singleton  blas  failures 
o multiple  blas  failures 
o hardover  failures 
o null  failures 
o ramp  failures 
o increased  scale  factor  failures 
o increased  noise  failures 
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TABLE 1. NOMINAL SENSOR MODEL PARAMETERS 
MISALIGNMENT  SYMMETRIC 
ANGLE  OUTPUT L I N T S  
NOISE BIAS 
LEV  EL LEV  EL 
SEflSOR 
TYPE 
SCALE 
FACTOR UNITS 
d s / s  . 40° 4.4,4.9,19.6 .098 .098 .25% 
.36 0 1 r)(l .02 2.85-5 . O l X  
Azrn,El .33 .03 N/A* 
OD Rng c 
I A S  
3. n 4 N/A N/A N / A  
2%(4.5)*** 1.0 m/ s N/A N/A 2!75/54** 
.23 .08 N/A N /A 8c1,80,600 
RP, ,305  .3n5 N/A r  
* - n o t  a p p l i e d  
* * - t w o  sided  (asymmetric) s top  l i m i t s  
*** - percent  (absolute)  
TABLE 2. NOMINAL  RSDIMU  SENSOR MODEL  PARAMETERS 
RATE GYROS LINEAR ACCELEROKETERS 
(deg/Hr) ( g ' s )  
Noise 0.125 1.25 E-5 
Bias 0.915 1.0 E-4 
Scale Factor (ppm) 75 75 
Mi sal i gnmen t (deg ) 3.333  E-3 3.333  E-3 
6-sensitive drift (deg/Hr) 0.015 0.015 
85 
In all of the  failure  conditions  above,  except  for  the  null,  hardover.  and  ramp 
cases,   i t  will be  convenient to  define a failure  level  with  respect  o  the  underlying 
normal  operating error level. For instance, if the  standard  deviation of the  normal 
operating  bias  for a given  sensor  is u, then a 50 bias  failure  for  that  sensor will 
signify that the failure level will come from a distribution with a standard deviation of 
50.  Similarly, the  u in a 100 increased  noise  failure will be  the  standard  deviation of 
the measurement noise associated with that  sensor .  A more detailed description of the 
sensor failure models can be found in [ l ]  and [ Z ] .  
Although repetitive  runs  for a given sensor  failure  type  under  varying  random 
conditions  have  b en  made,  the  collected  data was not  sufficient  to  c mpute 
experimental  false  alarm  and  probability of detection  figures. On the other hand, the 
repetitive  runs,  where  available,  have  been  used in obtaining  an  average  ”time-to- 
detect” and “time-to-heal” figure. 
The primary way of evaluating  performance will be to  examine the  actual time 
histories of the  no-fail  filter  state  estimation  errors  and  covariances. The 
information contamed in these plots, much of which would be lost in formmg ensemble 
statist ics,  1s partikularly  useful  in  providing  insight  into  the  operation of the FTS. In 
particular: 
o The transient effects of the failures can be seen. 
o The effects of using biased measurements are evident 
o The interaction of the  bias  filter  and  choice of biases  to  be  identified  can 
be viewed 
o The effects of the healer and re-configuration logic can be gauged 
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o How the flight path effects the no-fail filter and the propagation of failures 
can also be seen. 
Time histories will be presented as an estimation error profile, with the no-fail 
filter 's a posteriori (e.g. after the measurement update) covariance envelope. 
When viewing these error profiles note that although absolute performance of the  
no-fail filter is important, the filter serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it 's function 
is to provide accurate estimates for the A/C's current state.  While on the other hand, 
i t  must  perform  data  fusion  in such a way tha t  all sensors play a role in the 
estimation of those  same A/C states.  This last  function is critical if failures  in 
individual  sensors  are  to be  detectable.  Since,  at times,  these two functions  are 
clearly in conflict, no-fail filter parameters were chosen to satisfy both goals. 
3.2 Performance -with No Failures 
In this section, the performance of the FTS no-fail filter described in Section 2.2 
will be  discussed  using  the  results  obtained on the  six-degree-of-freedom  nonlinear 
simulation  described  in  Section 3.1. The inherent modelling e r ror  in the no-fail filter, 
arising from the  assumptions made  in the  design  were  discussed  in Section 3.1.1. 
Before we begin, however, we  will need to specify the specific parameters used in the 
FTS modules. 
Initial errors for the state and normal operating bias estimates are randomized. 
Their one sigma levels a t  FTS star t -up time are  given in Table 3. This table also gives 
the  standard  eviation of the  initial  uncertainty  for  these  variables.  Furthermore, 
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accelerometer  and  rate  gyro  biases  are  normally  estimated by the  no-fail  filter. 
Normal accelerometer  bias  levels  were  large  nough  that  their  compensation was 
necessary,  however,  normal  rate  gyro  biases  are  very small.  Rate  gyro  biases  were 
estimated to help eliminate false alarms associated with scale factor and misalignment 
modeling errors .  
Process and measurement noise statistics used by the no-fail filter are given in 
Table 4. Notice that  the  noise  levels  assumed by the  f i l ter   are given  in a per 
replication  manner - to  reflect  he  fact  hat  he  actual  process  and  measurement 
noise  statistics  used  depend  on  the  r plications of the  corresponding  sensors. 
Further   note   that   he  wind process  noise  doesn't  relate  to a physical  sensor  and 
therefore is replication independent. 
FTS detector parameters are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 gives the a 
priori  probability of failure,  detector  estimation window length,  and standard 
deviations of the  stimation  information  used  for  detector  esetting. Table 6 shows 
the bias and failure levels used in the healer module. The healer window length used 
was 3 seconds in all runs. 
Figure 10 shows the no-fail filter position estimation error time histories for a 
typical run. Each plot is made up of two par ts :  an error  time history - the solid line; 
and  an a posteriori  covariance  nvelope - the  two symmetrical  dashed  lines. Also, 
keep in mind that the covariance envelope represents the a posteriori covariance (e.g. 
after  processing  the  measurements),  and  therefore  does  reflect  the  level  used  in 
forming the Kalman gains or  the  innovations  covariance  used by the  detectors.  The 
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TABLE 3. NO-FAIL  FILTER  STATE  INITIAL  CONDITIONS 
"""""""- 
V a r i a b l e   E s t .   E r r o r   U n c e r t a i n t y  U n i t s  
(S.D.)  (S.D. 1 """""___""""~"- 
S t a t e s :  
x - rw 1 . 5 0 0 0 E + 0  1 
y-rw 1 . s 0 0 0 E + 0  i 
z - r w  5 . 0 0 8 0 E + 0 0  
x-do t-rw 1 . 5 0 8 0 E + 0 0  
y-d-3 t-rw 1 . 5 0 0 0 E + Q 0  
z -do  t-rw 1 . SQBQE+Q0 
phi 1 .0000E-01  
t h e t a  1 .Q013OE-0 1 
PSI 2 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0  1 
x-w i nd-rw 5. QOB0E-0 1 
y-w i n d-rw 5.00UOE-0 1 
A v e .  B i a s e s :  
x - a o c e l  1 . 0000E-0  1 
y - a o c e l   1 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1  
z - a , > c e l  1 .0080E-Q 1 
P - g y r o   2 . 8 0 0 0 E - 0 5  
Q - a y r o   2 . 8 0 8 0 E - 0 5  
R-gyro 2. SOOOE-05 
4 . 0 0 0 Q E + 0  1 rn 
4 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0  1 m 
3 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0  1 m 
4 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  ads 
4 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  m/s 
1 .250OE+0Q m/s 
5 .000QE-0  1 d e g  
5 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0  1 d e g  
1 . 5 0 0 Q E + 0 0   d e n  
7 .500OE-0 1 m/s 
7 . 5 8 0 0 E - 0  1 d s  
3.0480E-0 1 &S/S 
3 . 0 4 S 0 E - 0  1 m/s/s 
3 .04SQE-0  1 m/s/s 
2 . 5 6 0 0 E - 0  1 d e g / s  
2 .560BE-01 d e g / s  
2 . 5 6 0 0 E - 0 1  d e g / s  
"" 
TABLE 4 .  NO-FAIL  FILTER  PROCESS AND MEASUREMENT  NOISE  LEVELS 
""""""""" """ 
V a r i a b l e   N o i s e  S.D. R e p l i c a t i o n s   U i t s  
P e r  Rep1 . Used  
P r o c e s s  Noises: 
x - a c c e l   9 . 8 0 8 6 E - 0 2  1 m / s / s  
y - a e c e l   9 . 8 0 6 6 E - 0 2  1 d s / s  
z - a o c e  1 9 . S 0 6 6 E - 0 2  1 m/s/s 
P - g y r o   8 . 9 4 0 0 E - 0 2  1 d e g / s  
Q-gyro S.94BOE-02  1   deg/s  
R-gyro 8 .94B0E-02  1 d e g / s  
x - w i n d - r w   0 . 0 0 8 0 E + Q 0  N/A m/s 
y-wi nd-rw  0 .00BOE+80 N/A m / s  
Measuremen t Noises : 
31LS az im 6.00B0E-02 2 
MLS e l  6 . 0 0 8 0 E - 0 2  2 
MLS rng 6 . 0 0 9 Q E  + 00 2 
I AS 1 . 4 9 1 9 E + 0 0  2 
iMU phi  2.5 180E-0  1 2 
IMU t h e t a  2.5 ll3QE-0 1 - 7
I IU  p s i  2.5 180E-0 1 2 
R a d a r   a 1 t 3 . 0 4 3 Q E - 0  1 0 
""""""""" 
" 
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TABLE 5.  DETECTOR  ESET  PARAMETERS 
D e t s c t o r  W i n d o w   L e n g t h  = 1 . 0 0 0 0 0   S e c o n d s  
S e n s o r   A p r i i   E s t .  Window E s t i m a t i o n  U n i t s  
T y p e   P r o b a b i  1 i t y  ( s e c )  I n f o r m a t i o n  
(S.D. 1 
S i n i 3 u l a r  F a i l u r e s :  
x - a s c e l   4 . 6 0 0 0 E - 0 9  3.00000 9 . 2 9 0 3 E - 0 3  ~ S / S  
y - a s c e l  
z - a s c e  1 
P - g y r o  
Q - g y r o  
R-gyro  
MLS e l  
M L S  a z i m  
MLS r n g  
I AS 
IMU p h i  
IMU t h e t a  
IMU p s i  
R a d a r  a l t  
4 . 6 0 0 0 E - 0 9  
4 . 6 0 8 0 E - 0 9  
4 . 6 0 Q 0 E - 0 9  
4 . 6 0 8 0 E - 0 9  
4.60130E- 1 0  
3 . 5 0 0 0 E - 0 9  
3 . 5 0 0 0 E - 0 9  
3 . 5 0 9 0 E - 0 9  
3 .1580E-OS 
2 . 2 5 0 0 E - 0 8  
2.25BOE-08 
3. S08OE- 10 
2 . 2 5 8 0 E - 0 9  
3.00000 9 . 2 9 0 3 E - 0 3  
3.00000 9 . 2 9 0 3 E - 0 3  
3.00000 0 . 0 0 0 Q E + 0 0  
3.00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
3.80000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 .00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 .00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 .00000 0 . 0 0 0 Q E + 0 0  
1 .00000 @ . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 . QQQQQ 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 .00000 0 . 0 8 0 Q E + 0 0  
1 . 00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
1 .00000 0 . 0 0 0 0 E + 0 0  
S i m u l t a n e o u s  M u l t i p l e  F a i l u r e s :  
IIlLS a z i m  1 . 2 2 5 0 E - 1 4  
YLS e l  1 . ZZSQE- 1 4  
!1LS r n g   1 . 2 2 5 0 E - 1 4  ~"~""""""_""""""""""_ 
TABLE 6. DETECTOR  HEALER  PARAMETERS 
H e a l e r  Window L e n g t h  = 3.00000 S e c l n d s  
S e n s o r   B i a s  Est  F a i l u r e  Es t  Units 
TYP. T h r e s o   I d   T h r e s h 0 1 , c l  
x - a o c e l  
y-a , .cel  
P - g y r o  
z - a c c e l  
Q - g y r o  
R-gyro  
MLS a z  im 
MLS e 1 
MLS r n g  
I AS 
IMU p h i  
I>lU t h e t a  
I!lU p s i  
R a d a r  a 1  t 
2.00f30E-01 5 . 0 0 0 Q E - 0 1  
2 . 0 0 8 0 E - 0  1 5 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0  1 
2 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0  1 5 . 0 0 0 0 E - 0  1 
1 . 2 0 8 0 E - 0 3  1 . 2 0 0 0 E - 0 2  
1 . 2 0 8 0 E - 0 3  1 . 2 0 0 0 E - 0 2  
1 .2000E-@3 1 .2000E-02 
6 . 0 0 8 O E - 0 2  1 . SOWE-0  1 
Cj.0080E-02 1 .580OE-0 1 
1 .2080E+O 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 E + Q  1 
1 . 2 0 8 0 E + 0 0  2 . 5 0 0 O E + 0 0  
3. 0006~-o i 3 .  O O Q Q E - ~  1 
2.0000E-0 1 5. QQQQE-0 1 
2.0000E-E) 1 5. 000QE-0 1 
6. 1000E-0 1 1 .50QOE +0Q 
90 
I 
0.0 50.0 100.0 150.0 200.0 258.0  300.0 
TIME (seconds1 
FIG. 10. POSITION ESTIMATION ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 11. VELOCITY  ESTIMATION  ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 12. ATTITUDE  ESTIMATION  ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 13. HORIZONTAL WIND ESTIMATION  ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 14. ACCELEROMETER BIAS ESTIMATION ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 15. RATE GYRO BIAS ESTIMATION ERROR - NO-FAILURES 
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FIG. 16. TRUE A/C TRACK ERRORS - NO-FAILURES 
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first attr ibute  one  notices is that  position  estimation  error  profiles  are  somewhat 
biased. This is attributable  to  the  uncompensated  normal  operating  biases of t he  
measurements. Examination of the  EKF gain (at several points in the run) for rx and r 
Y 
show tha t  MLS azimuth  and  range  measurements  are  used  heavily  in  forming  these 
estimates.  Whereas, MLS elevation  and  range  are  primarily  used  for  estimating r L .  
Given the level of uncompensated bias in MLS measurements (found in Table 1) and the 
range  as  a function of time,  these  biases  can  be  almost  totally  accounted  for. In 
general: 
o The bias  levels  shift  in  response  to  changes  in  the  flight  path - since  the 
EKF gain is redistributed for the new flight path.  
o The quantity SQRT[ 1?,12 + ] and I?,[ diminish a s  touchdown is 
approached (where ?, = rm - r m  Le. estimation error). A 
o The a posteriori  covariance is small  due  to the low measurement  noise 
assumed for MLS measurements. 
o Vertical estimation error characteristically is not effected by changes in the 
flight  path. Its error  diminishes  primarily  due  to  the  diminishing  effect of 
the unidentified MLS elevation normal operating bias. 
No-fail filter  velocity  estimation  error  profiles  are  shown  in  Figure 11 for  the 
same  sample  run. Keep in mind that  these  variables  are  xpressed  in  the  runway 
- not   the body  frame of reference. The error  levels  for  all the  profiles  are 
reasonable and both lateral and vertical velocity errors converge to within the one- 
sigma covariance  nvelopes. The nearly  linear  convergence of the  vertical  velocity 
e r ror  is again due to the diminishing impact of the unidentified MLS elevation sensor’s 
normal operating bias. The convergence in the x and y directions is characteristically 
flight  path  dependent. The lowest errors  tend  to  occur  when  the  signal  level of the  
variable is close  to zero  (see  Figure 9). Therefore,  periods  when  the  aircraft is 
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perpendicular  to  the  runway  (the A/C’s velocity is in the y runway  direction), x 
estimation error will typically be low. 
The  approximately 1 m / s  bias’ visible  in the x velocity  error  profile  after 
150 seconds is due principally to the poor wind estimation performance. Remember, a 
30 knot horizontal wind is present in all our runs. Lower  wind levels scaled this bias 
e r ror  downward. Note tha t  a .5 m / s  spike occurs around 255 seconds in the vertical 
velocity  error  curve. This is  due  to  the  reconfiguration  logic. A t  this  point  in  the 
trajectory,  MLS elevation measurements are replaced by radar altimeter measurements. 
The important point is to notice the selectivity of the reset  - i t  only effects vertical 
velocity  and  vertical  accelerometer  bias  errors. This is  an  important  feature of the 
developed FTS. 
Attitude  estimation  errors  are  shown in  Figure 12. An rms error  value of 
0.05°-0.10 in  roll,  pitch,  and yaw  as typical of all the  runs.  These error  levels 
correspond  roughly  to  the  unidentified  normal  operating  bias  values in the  IMU 
measurements.  Increases  in  the  attitude  estimation  errors  during  banking  maneuvers 
is due to the approximations resulting from using  Euler  integration  for  the  kinematic 
equations  in  the  single  stage  prediction  part of the  no-fail  filter,  and  the  fact  that 
the filter is running at only a 20 Hz sample rate (typical update rates in conventional 
navigators vary between 60 and 70 Hz). 
5The level of this  bias is actually larger than l e v e l s  normally  observed. A more typical 
level would be approximately 0.3 m/s. 
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In this run, there was a false alarm in the roll ra te  gyro  a t  251 seconds which 
was correctly  declared  "recovered"  by the  healing  tests  at 258.9 seconds. The 
favorable  impact of the  healing  decision  can  be  seen  in  the  roll  attitude  estimation 
e r ror  time history. 
Horizontal wind estimation  error  time  histories  are  given in  Figure 13. Although 
some degradation  in  the  horizontal wind estimates  are t o  be  xpected  ue  to  the 
assumptions of zero  angle of attack  and  side  slip  nthe indicated  airspeed 
measurement model, the steady-state estimation errors in these variables are largely 
due  to  the wind model used  in  the  design of the  filter.  Specifically,  the  unknown 
constant  random  variable model for  the  horizontal  winds  causes  the  filter  to  become 
oblivious to the indicated airspeed measurements after the first maneuver. We believe 
that gain limiting on the horizontal winds would eliminate this behavior. 
Error time  histories for the  accelerometer  and  rate  gyro  bias  estimates  are 
shown  in  Figures 14 and 15. Note the  initial  bias  errors  visible  in  the  error  trace 
before  the FTS is  initiated  (at  approximately 35 seconds). The good  convergence 
characteristics  for  the  accelerometer  bias  estimates  were  typical of other   runs with 
different  bias  levels.  Identification of accelerometer  bias  levels  made a significant 
contribution to the improvement of position and velocity estimates. On the other hand, 
rate  gyro  biases  are  identified  in  order  to  introduce  uncertainty  into  the  kinematic 
models, and to help compensate for transient modeling errors due to scale factor and 
misalignment e r rors  - although  the  actual  bias  levels  in  the  rate gyro measurements 
were too small to be of any significance. 
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Figure 16 shows  various A/C track  error  profiles  for  this  run.  These  rror 
levels  were  typical  for  the  no-fail  case.  Although  these  curves  are  on  indication of 
overall  system  performance,  the  r ader  should  remember  that  they  include  the 
idiosyncrasies of the  automatic  ontrol law. That  is to  say,  the  control laws a re  
parameterized in a particular way and  are   therefore  more  sensitive to  particular 
parameter variations. 
3.3 Performance with Bias Failures 
This section describes the observed performance of the FTS under simulated bias 
failures.  Since  the FTS was  designed  with the implicit  assumption  that  failures would 
appear  as  bias jumps  in a sensor 's   outputs,  we should  expect  he  best  performance 
here.  A s  discussed  in  Section 3.1.2, the  format of this  section will be to  discuss  the 
results from the context of individual  simulation  runs,  in  order  to  give  the  reader a 
deeper insight into how the  method operates.  Observed FTS bias failure detection and 
isolation  performance will be  described  using  the  standard  sensor  configuration,  and 
an  alternative  configuration employing an  RSDIMU in  the  first two subsections, 
respectively. The last  subsection  describes  performance when multiple (MLS) failures 
occur simultaneously in time. 
3.3.1 Singleton Bias Failures - Standard Sensor Configuration 
In this section bias failure performance will be discussed for the standard sensor 
configuration. In particular,  three  sample  runs will be  utilized.  These runs were 
chosen  to  be  representative,  and  in  addition,  to  highlight  strong,  as well as  weak 
points in the  current  implementation. Table 7 describes  the  simulated  failure 
conditions  for  each of these  runs  (where  each  run is identified  mnemonically). The 
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names  chosen are BF-1, BF-2, and BF-3, where BF stands  for  bias  failure.   Further 
not ice  in  the table  that  the first run ,  BF-1, has a single sensor,  MLS elevation, which 
fails at time 80.6 seconds, with a failure magnitude of 0.24 degrees (this represents an 
8 sigma failure level). In the majority of the runs used in  this  chapter ,  three or more 
failures are simulated in a single sample run. The implications of t h i s  a r e  tha t  it will 
save CPU costs,  however,  observability  and  time  to  detect of the  remaining  sensors 
may be affected. 
We will now discuss each of these  runs  in  detail ,  beginning  with  run BF-1. 
Generally, only error profiles, which differ from those of the previous section, will be 
shown.  In this  sample  run,  no  false  alarms  were  recorded,  and  no  false  healings 
occurred.  The  bias  failure  was  simulated  to  occur  at  80.6  seconds,  and it was 
detected at  81.  seconds yielding a t ime to detect  of .4 seconds. Turning our attention 
now to Figure 17 and 18, we see that - the effects of the elevation failure are negligible 
on  x  and y posit ion  and  velocity  estimation  errors.   That is to   say   tha t   he   t ime 
histories  are  very  similar  to  those  one  would  have  seen  had  no  failure  occurred. 
However, z position  and  velocity  errors  (the  bottom  curves),  show  pronounced 
transient effects at  the t ime of failure onset. Although the failure is detected (and the 
system is reconfigured)  quickly, it takes  aperiod of approximately 20 seconds  to 
completely  remove  the  effects of this  failure  from  the  state  estimates.  On the  other  
hand,  the  disruptive  ffects  are  localized  and  are  at  a level  similar  to  that  which 
occurred  atinit ialization. The r a t e  of convergence for these  error   curves  is 
noticeably  slower  than  observed  at  start-up. This is due  to  the  higher  effective 
measurement noise on MLS elevation measurements assumed by the no-fail filter after 
system reconfiguration. 
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TABLE 7. DESCRIPTION  OF  BIAS  FAILURE  RUNS - STANDARD SENSOR  CONFIGURATION 
RUfl I/D 
BF-3. 
BF-2 
BF-2 
BF-2 
BF-3 
BF-3 
BF-3 
SENSOR 
FAILED 
El-2 
P-1  
R- 1 
e - 1  
.4zm- 1 
El -1 
FAILIJRE 
MAGNITSIDE 
. 2n0( 8u) 
.1 degrees/s 
.1 degrees/s 
.8 degrees 
.3O( 1 0 4  
.3O( 1W) 
.8O( 19u) 
FAILURE 
ONSET TIME 
(seconds) 
115.9 
66. Q 
223.65 
m. 65 
221.9 
66.65 
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FIG. 17. POSITION  ESTIMATION  ERROR - BIAS  FAILURE  CASE BF-1  
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The next sample run to consider is run BF-2. Table 7 shows that roll rate, yaw 
rate  and IMU theta failures are all simulated in this run. These sensors all affect the 
attitude  determination of the  aircraft,  and  they  are  coupled  through  the  kinematic 
equations of motion.  Therefore,  in  this  run, we will analyze how well the  FTS system 
can discern input sensor from measurement sensor failures. 
The failure  detection  performance in this case was quite  good. All failures  were 
correctly identified and there were no false alarms o r  false healings during this run. 
The time  to detect  for  roll  rate  gyro was 2.75 seconds,  and yaw rate  gyro was 
4.05 seconds. The detection  time  for  theta was 0.3 seconds. This is a typical 
characterist ic of input  versus  measurement  sensor  failures. In all of the  runs 
measurement  sensor  failures  were  detected  at  least  an  order  magnitude  faster  than 
input  sensor  failures. This is due  primarily  to  the  fact  hat  he  input  failures,  in 
order  to  be  identified by the  detectors ,  must  propagate  through  the  no-fail  filter 
dynamics to put their signature on the residuals. 
As mentioned previously, these sensors are used primarily to determine the A/C’s 
att i tude,   and  therefore only  degradation  to the  no-fail  filter’s  attitude  stimates 
should be observed. In fact, examination of the position and velocity estimation error 
curves shown  in  Figures 19 and 20  show that   the  FTS has  this  desirable  property. 
Notice that the position and velocity estimation errors all lie within bounds which a re  
typical of a no-failure case. Furthermore, disruptions due to resets after failures are 
6 
‘Since the attitude  estimates  are  used  to  resolve  the  accelerometer  measurements,  failures 
w i l l  eventually be observed in the  other  states - but to l e s s  an  extent. 
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not felt by these state estimates. This  is an important attribute of t he  developed FTS 
- without  it   resets  due  to  correct  failure  detections  (as well as  false  alarms) would 
drastically  reduce  the  stimation  error  performance of the  system  as  discussed  in 
Section 2.6. 
Viewing the  attitude  estimation  error  curve,  Figure  21,  the  effects  are  seen  to 
be  pronounced  here.  Phi  estimation  error,  the  top  diagram,  shows a ramp  occurring 
between  the time of the  roll  rate  gyro  failure  and  its  detection. A t  118.65  seconds 
when the roll rate  gyro  bias  failure is detected  and  the  standby  roll  rate  gyro 
replaces  the failed sensor,  a reset  occurs. A similar  effect is seen  in  the  psi  error 
when the yaw rate  gyro  fails. Notice the reset  in phi has no effect on theta and psi 
errors .  In this  portion of the  run,  phi 1s less  coupled  to  theta  and  psi - and  the 
reset  logic accounts  for  this  fact.  For  example,  the yaw rate  gyro  failure  occurs 
during a banking  maneuver,  when  couplings  are  stronger,  and its reset  effects  theta 
estimation  error.  Moreover,  notice  that  after  both of the  rate  gyro  resets,   the 
estimation  errors  become  biased. This  eems to  be a fairly  typical  phenomenon  after 
an  input  sensor  failure. We feel  this  is  due  to  the  fact  hat  he  input  sensor  bias 
estimates were reset in a rather hard fashion. These resets can be seen more clearly 
in Figure 22. Because the bias estimation error uncertainty on rate gyros is. reset  so 
hard,  the no-fail  filter  primarily uses the raw IMU measurements  to  get  an  estimate 
for  the  attitudes.  Since  these  measurements  are  biased, a step  in  the  stimation 
error curves is observed. The effects of the  M U  theta failure on the estimation error 
curves  cannot  be  seen. This is  due simply to  the  fact   hat   he  theta  failure was 
detected and isolated quickly, in 0.3 seconds. Therefore, it simply wasn't present for a 
long enough period to affect the filter estimates. 
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TABLE 8. SUMMARY OF AVERAGE BIAS  FAILURE  PERFORMANCE - STANDARD 
CONFIGURATION 
SENSORS 
Input Sensors 
P 
Q 
R 
Measurement Sensors 
Azm 
El 
Rng 
IAS 
0 
0 
v 
RA 
AVERAGE TIME TO NUMBER OF 
DETECT (Seconds) SIFN!LATED  FAILURES 
4.65 3 
14.65 3 
FI.D.* 3 
13.32 
8.12 
6.1 
0.9 
9.15 
0.08 
1.57 
0.57 
0.43 
0.8 
9.3 
NUMBER OF MISSED 
DETECTIONS 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
I )  
* Not Detected 
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The third  and  final  sample  run,  to  be  discussed,  is  called BF-3 in  Table 7. I t  
consists of three measurement failures. They include two MLS failures of azimuth  and 
elevation,  and  also a psi  attitude  failure  in  the IMU. A s  we found  out  in  the  last 
example,  the time to  detect   is  much  quicker  for  sensors which a re   t rea ted   as  
measurements into the no-fail filter. Detection times for this run were  0.9,  0.15,  and 
0.35 seconds  for MLS azimuth,  elevation  and IMU psi,  respectively.  Because  the 
detection times are so quick the estimation error profiles are not much different from 
those  already  seen - so they will not  be  presented.  There  were,  however, two false 
alarms and two correct healings which occurred during this run. The affected sensors 
were the roll rate gyro, which was incorrectly detected as failed at time 248.9 seconds 
and  then  healed  at  251.9  seconds',  and  the  pitch  rate gyro which  failed a t  253.65 
seconds. The primary reason for these false alarms is tha t  when the IMU psi failure is 
detected  early in the  run  (at  67  seconds)  an  entire IMU is  removed  from the 
measurement  set of the  filter. This forces  the  no-fail  filter  to trust the  rate  gyros 
more, thereby increasing the effects of integration errors.  
Up to  this  point  details  were  primarily  about  individual  sample  time  histories, 
and  particular  sequences of failures in order  to  understand how the  fault  olerant 
system  works.  Here we present a summary of the  average  failure  d tection 
performance  observed  over  all  the  runs. Table 8 describes  the  average  performance 
by presenting the average time-to-detect for each sensor type. Also included  in  the 
table  is  the  total  number of simulated  failures  and  number of missed detections by 
'This is the  fastest that healing i s  allowed  to  occur  due  to  the  assumptions  made in the 
healer logic. 
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sensor  type. The average  time-to-heal is not shown in the  table  because  i t  was 
approximately 3 seconds  for  all  sensors. The runs  which  comprise  the  table  have 
random failure levels of 3a, 50, 80, loa,  or 120. The reader should note that the total  
number of runs represented here is quite small. Furthermore, since the average time- 
to-detect figure shown is the average of from one to four samples (columns 2-3), one 
shouldn't place much weight on the actual numbers, but only look at them relative to 
one another. 
Summarizing Table 8 we see that  
o Input sensors take considerably longer to detect than do sensors treated as 
measurements to the no-fail filter. 
o Input  sensors  are  harder  to  distinguish  than  measurement  sensors - the  
number of missed detections is noticeably higher. 
o Although not explicitly shown in the table, detection times for input sensors 
a re  much more sensitive to the absolute level of the failure simulated. 
o Vertical accelerometer failures were not detected for 3a,5o,8a,and 100 failure 
levels.' Two factors contributed to this situation: 
. The signal level on the vertical accelerometer was Ig.  
. The normal operating bias filter was able to monotonically decrease the 
impact on the failure of the system, by slowly estimating i t  out .  
o MLS azimuth  takes  considerably  longer  to detect  relative  to ther MLS 
sensors. 
o IAS is the slowest to detect of all measurement sensors. 
o Of the  IMU sensors, yaw failures are the most difficult to  detect .  
'However. nul I and  hardover  fai lures  were  detected. 
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Some general  comments  about  particular  problems  that  were  ncountered in 
running  this  matrix of cases seem appropriate  at this  point. Typically a missed 
detection of an accelerometer sensor failure induced an MLS false alarm. Also, for roll 
rate  gyros,  occasionally  an IMU false  alarm was observed,  rather  than a correct 
detection of the  corresponding  input  sensor. In these  cases - where  the FTS was 
unable  to  distinguish  dynamically  related  sensors - examination of the  a-posteriori  
probability of failure obtained from the decision logic showed nearly equal probability 
of failure  for  the  failed  sensor  and  the  dynamically  related  one.  This  indicates  that 
this behavior can be improved by: 
o Adding heuristics to the decision logic to evaluate this situation better. 
o Add  off diagonal  costs  in  the  decision logic - i.e.  and a larger  cost  for 
making an incorrect decision. 
In the case of radar altimeters, which turn on very late in the run, several times the 
wrong  replication  was  chosen. This  was due mainly to the fact  that  the fi l ter’s state 
estimates  are  biased  due  to  the  uncompensated  normal  operating  biases  contained  in 
the measurements. 
For the  case of singleton  bias  failures  the  fault  tolerant  system  works  very 
capably. Detection speeds are very quick for measurement sensors into the filter, and 
also  adequate  for  input  sensors  although  they  are  typically  detected  an  order of 
magnitude  slower. The state  estimates  appear  to  have  the  quality of fault  tolerance, 
in that they are able to recover in  most  cases from the effects of failure.  Moreover, 
the  fault  olerant  system  has  the  desirable  property  that a failure  in  one  sensor 
affects  only  related  quantities of the no-fail  filter,  therefore,  transient  effects  are 
minimized. In addition, for the case of bias failures, the healers work quite adequately 
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a s  well, however, it’s clear  that  he  effects of false  alarms  can  cause  considerable 
problems. 
3.3.2 Singleton Bias Failures - RSDIMU Sensor Configuration 
This section  discusses  observed  performance  attained  using a redundant  strap 
down inertial  measurement  unit  in  place of the  usual  body  mounted  rate  gyro  and 
accelerometer  measurements. In addition,  since  the RSDIMU also  provides  attitude 
outputs, these are used in lieu of measurements from the platform IMU. 
The impact of these  replacements  on  the FTS configuration  and  parameters  are 
as  follows: 
o No estimation of input normal operatmg biases is performed 
o No detection  and  isolation is performed on RSDIMU based  measurements 
- since it has its own on-board fault detection and isolation logic. 
o The FTS reconfigures  itself  internally  to perate  the  proper  number of 
detector/LR  computers  (in our example  this is 8, and  in the  standard 
configuration it is 20). 
o Process and measurement noise levels chosen for the no-fail filter remain at 
the levels used in the standard sensor configuration. 
The last item  seems  inappropriate  at  first - since  the RSDIMU provides  navigation 
quality  rather  than  flight  quality  information. However, if process  noise  levels  were 
set  appropriate  for  the RSDIMU measurement  noise  level,  the  no-fail  filter would 
ignore  most of the other measurements, and therefore, detection of failures  in  these 
other sensors would not be possible. 
For this  configuration  the  transient  effects  due  to  failures,  and  the  error time 
history plots are very similar to those observed for the standard configuration (they 
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a re  only slightly better), therefore, they will not be shown. The only exception to this 
is for $,e, and h, where - since we are not estimating normal operating biases on P,Q, 
and R - they  appear  more  biased  during  maneuvers  than  the  standard  configuration. 
These effects can be minimized by "tuning" the measurement noise parameters assumed 
by the EKF on P,Q, and R,  and on $ 3 ,  and +. Estimation of normal operational biases 
for  the  rate  gyros will further  reduce  these  ffects. However, since we are  only 
concerned with failures  in MLS. IAS, and RA sensors,  these  rrors  don't  impact 
performance, and therefore no further tuning was performed.' 
Table 9 describes  theaverage  detection  performance for  the RSDIMU 
configuration. It should  be  noted  that  there  were  no  false  alarms or missed 
detections  in  any of these  runs. However, since  under  this  configuration, we are  not 
considering  failures  in  any RSDIMU sensors  (i.e.  only MLS, IAS. and RA failures  are 
considered)  this  eliminates many sensors from consideration,  thereby making the 
detection task easier. 
Viewing Table 9 we see that :  
o Detection  times  for  all  sensors  are  on  the  order of those  found  for  the 
standard configuration (see Table 8). 
o There  were  no  missed  detections. 
o MLS azimuth is the most difficult MLS sensor to detect  
o Although not  shown  explicitly  in  the  table,  detection  times  were  constant 
over all portions of the flight path. 
' I n   f a c t ,   f o r   t h i s   c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,   t h e   f i   I t e r   c o u l d  be c o l l a p s e d   t o   e l   i m i n a t e   t h e   a t t i t u d e  
channel  altogether - to  further  educe  the  computat ional   requirements.  
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In general, the RSDIMU configuration performed very well. Although we expected 
to  see better  performance  and  detection  speeds  for  this  configuration, we observed 
only  slightly  better  performance.  Additional Monte Carlo  simulations of each 
configuration would be required to provide a better comparison. 
3.3.3 Simultaneous Multiple Bias Failures - Standard Sensor Configuration 
In this  section,  performance when two sensors fail a t  t he  same  instant of time, 
will be  examined. Only multiple failures in  like MLS measurements  were  considered  in 
this study, and will be reported herein. 
The FTS parameters  used  are  the  same  as  described  in  Section 3.2. The error  
profiles for these failures look very much like the no-fail case, and therefore will not 
be  presented  here.  In fact ,   af ter  a multiple MLS failure is correctly  detected a 
mission abort  is issued,  since  the  no-fail  filter  equires  at  least  one of each MLS 
measurement t o  operate. 
Table 10 describes  the  simultaneous  multiple  failure  performance of the  FTS. All 
multiple  failure  sample  runs  made  in the  study  are  represented  here.  Since MLS 
azimuth is harder   to   detect   than MLS elevation or range,  azimuth  failures  were 
simulated over all flight conditions, whereas MLS elevation and range were only failed 
once.  Detection  speed  and  selectivity is very  good,  with  correct  detections  in  all 
cases  and  average  detection  times of 6.37, 0.2, and 0.15 for  azimuth,  elevation,  and 
range  sensors,  respectively. Over this  set  of runs  the  detection  times  were  basically 
constant  over  different  failure  levels  and  flight  path  segments.  Notice,  further,  that 
although  false  alarms  were  associated with  some of the  runs,   they did not  interfere 
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TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF AVERAGE BIAS  FAILURE  PERFORMANCE - RSDIMU  CONFIGURATION 
SENSOR 
Azm 
El 
IAS 
RA 
AVG. T I M E  TO 
DETECT (Seconds) 
0.42 
0.18 
0.09 
0.4 
0.15 
NO. OF RUNS NO. OF MISSED 
SIMULATED DETECTIONS 
5 0 
5 0 
5 0 
1 !I 
1 0 
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with the correct detection and isolation of this class of failure. 
3.4 Performance with Non-Bias Failures 
As mentioned a t  t he  s t a r t  of this chapter, one of the goals of the study was to  
assess how  well the developed FTS can operate when failures of a non-bias type are 
encountered. This section discusses the observed robustness of the system under the 
following failure modes: hardover.  null,  ramp,  increased  scale  factor,  and  increased 
noise  failures. A subsection  is devoted  to  discussions  pertinent  to  each of these 
conditions. 
3.4.1 Hardover Failures 
The primary  attribute  required of an  FTS when hardover  failures might be 
encountered is fast  detection  times.  Ideally  one would like  to  remove  faulty 
measurements  before  they  are  used in the  navigation  filter.  This is particularly 
important  in our FTS since  the  no-fail  filter is an  extended Kalman filter  (e.g. 
linearizations are about estimated states) and filter divergence can occur quickly. For  
this  reason, if redundant  sensors  are  available  and  hardover  failures  are a common 
problem, we advocate  the  use of voting  techniques  to  achieve  quick  hardover  failure 
detection and isolation. As we will see,  the FTS discussed' in this section provides an 
alternative approach i f  redundant sensors are not available. 
Since  hardover  failures  can  be viewed as  very  large  bias  failures, we should 
expect good  performance  from  the  developed FTS. In fact,  observed  isolation  and 
detection  speed is quite good - it  typically  takes  one  filter  cycle  (i.e. two 
measurement samples) to detect a hardover failure. 
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TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE  BIAS  FAILURE  PERFORMANCE 
ML S 
S E N S O R   F A I L U R E  
T Y P E   L E V E L  
A z i m u t h  .3'( 100) 
E l e v a t i o n  .3'( loa) 
R a n g e   4 0 m  ( 1 Oa) 
A z i m u t h  .3'( loa) 
A z i m u t h  .3'(1Qu) 
F A I L U R E  
O X S E T  
T I M E  
" 
110.0 
70. 0 
7Q. 0 
70. !I 
255 
T I ? l E  TO 
D E T E C T  
0.6 
0.2 
0.15 
0.6 
0.65 
NIJMBER OF 
F A L S E   A L A R M S /  
S E N S O R   T Y P E  
0 
UPsz 
1 / P .  Y 
0 
1/Ay 
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Table 11 shows the detection performance for a typical run. Hardover failures in 
indicated airspeed, IMU theta,  and  roll  rate  gyros  are  simulated. Remember tha t  only 
one  replication of the  roll  rate  gyro is used by the  FTS, and  therefore,  no  direct 
redundancy is used in its detection. 
The sample  time  for  the  system is 0.05 seconds  (e.g. 20 Hz) and  therefore  all 
three failures are detected in one filter cycle. The fact that three very hard failures 
occurred fairly close to one another, and did not significantly affect the performance 
of t he  FTS is encouraging. This  implies that   he  f i l ter  was able  to  recover  quickly 
from the effects of failures. 
Figures 23, 24, and 25 show the estimation error profiles for attitude, rate gyro 
biases, and accelerometer biases, respectively. These figures show how the reset  logic 
can directly effect filter performance. From Table 10 we saw tha t  a false alarm in IMU 
phi occurred right after the failed roll rate gyro was removed.  This was directly due 
to  the  large  reset  used  for  the  phi  state  and p bias  estimates  and  their  associated 
covariances. The filter  diverges  as a. result of the  reset,  and  cannot  recover  since 
both M U ' S  were removed (one due to a failure and the other due to the false alarm). 
The large reset  was due to the reset  logic applying a reset proportional to the failure 
level - i t  was  designed  assuming  moderate  bias  failure  l vels.  Since  the  failure 
estimates from the detectors  may contain significant errors when hardover failures are 
encountered,  an  obvious  solution would be to  threshold  the  reset  to  remain  within a 
reasonable range. 
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TABLE 11. DETECTION  PERFORMANCE  FOR  TYPICAL HARDOVER 
T I M E  T O  
SENSOR 
I A S  
0 
P 
F A I L U R E  MAG. 
205.78 m/s 
80' 
100 O/S 
ONSET T I M E  
(seconds) 
67.08 
114.05 
153.5n 
False Alarms 
Sensor Time of False Alarm 
( s e c o r i i  
9 -2 1S3.65 
QETECT 
7 5 Z i X S )  
0.05 
0.05 
0. n5 
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FIG. 24. RATE GYRO BIAS ESTIMATION ERROR - HARDOVER FAILURE 
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3.4.2 Null Failures 
" 
Null failures pose an interesting problem for the FTS. Although they may appear 
as a bias jump in the measurement, this only happens if the actual signal level is not 
close to zero. Essentially, to be detectable, the signal level must be greater than the 
smallest  bias  level  detectable  by  the FTS. Moreover, the  effective  failure  l vel 
fluctuates as a function of t he  signal level, such that at times i t  may appear as a soft, 
mid or hard failure. In fact, even if the failure is correctly detected, the healer logic 
can easily be tricked into believing the sensor has recovered during the next period 
of low signal level. A single sample run, which contains null failures, will be discussed 
in  this  section.  Certainly many  more  simulation  runs would be  required  to  generalize 
the results presented here. 
Table 12 shows the  detection  performance  for a run with  null  failures  present. 
The first null failure effects the IMU phi measurement during a banking maneuver (e.g. 
when the  signal  level  is  large),  whereas  the  second  failure  is in the pitch rate gyro 
when its  signal  level  is  very  close  toz ro. The first  failure is detected  in
0.15 seconds  (e.g.  three  filter  cycles),  however,  it is not  removed  quickly  enough  to 
prevent a roll  rate  gyro  false  alarm. The second  failure is not detected, as expected, 
since  its  ignal  evel is very  small. I t  does,  however,  instigate a pitch  sensor  false 
alarm. 
Another  perspective  is  shown  in the  stimation  error  profiles  for  this run, 
Figures 26-30. These  curves  clearly show the  coupling  effects  during  the  bank 
maneuver.  Notice  the  null  failure in + effects 4, 0. P, and Q, but it also  effects x,,, 
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yrw, x,,, yrw, A,, and A The encouraging thing to note here is tha t  the  FTS manages 
to recover from the first failure. 
Y '  
The second failure requires some explanation to understand what is taking place. 
First of all, one might assume that since the signal level on Q is small,  (see  fig. 6), a 
null  failure  shouldn't  impact  the  stimates  very much  (look a t  Q bias  errors  in 
figure 30, for example). However, in this case the null failure in Q instigates a 8 false 
alarm. Note in  figure 7 tha t  8 is not  zero,  rather  it 's  changing slowly.  This removes 
all  attitude  measurements from the  filter.  Therefore, with Q=O, €)=constant. From this 
point on the estimation error in €) fluctuates as a function of the  difference  between 
the true signal and this constant,  plus any other contributions from the filter update 
using the rest of the measurements (see fig. 28). 
Although  very few runs  were made  with  null failures,  we would anticipate  the 
following problems: 
o Occasionally dynamically coupled sensors will be chosen (e.g. 4 when P fails, 
El when A, fails, etc.) 
o Filter  divergence  when  detections  are  too slow, and  the  ffective  failure 
level is large. 
o Declaring a faulty  sensor  "recovered" when a low signal  evel is monitored 
for a period of time. 
On the other hand these results are encouraging since: 
o They  show that  null  failures  can  be  detected  without  any  modifications  to 
the original method. 
o The bias jump failure  models  are  "robust"  enough  to  provide  coverage  for 
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these  failures - however,  either a bet ter  model or more  heuristics will be 
required for reliable detection, and healer operation. 
3.4.3 Ramp Failure 
Ramp failures appear in the measurements as slowly increasing biases - in other 
words,  at every  successive  step, a new, incremental  bias jump is  applied  to  the 
measurement. If the  slope of the  ramp  failure  is  lar.ge,  the  incremental  bias jump is 
large, and it will appear much like a bias failure would. In this case we would expect 
the  FTS to detect it without modification. However, if the slope of the failure is small, 
the failure may go undetected  for a long  period of time, or i t  may create  a drift  in 
the  no-fail  filter  estimates  and  never  be  correctly  identified. In this  ection, FTS 
performance under ramp failures will be discussed by means of a typical example. 
Performance  for a typical  sample  run  is  hown  in  Table 13. Ramp failures  are 
simulated for Azm,  8, P ,  and A, sensors.  The failure levels chosen in the table reflect 
the slope required to attain a 3a normal operating bias in one second for each sensor. 
Figures 31-36 show the  estimation  error  and A/C track  error  profiles for the  same 
case.  
From Table 13 we see  that  all  simulated  failures  are  correctly  detected  and 
isolated by the FTS. Sensors which are  t reated as measurements are detected slightly 
fas ter   than  those  t reated as inputs  to  the  no-fail  filter. This was found  to  be a 
common trait of the  developed  system.  Another  characteristic  for  amp, as well as 
other  non-bias  failures,  is  the  induced  false  alarms  caused by the  reset   af ter   the  
failure  is  correctly  detected. This is observed  in  the 4 and RA failures  in  this  case. 
The false alarm in MLS elevation, however, is not due to the reset logic, but rather to 
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TABLE 12. DETECTION  PERFORMANCE  FOR  NULL  FAILURES 
SENSOR 
TYPE 
0-1 
Q- 1 
FAILURE 
ONSET TIME 
1 seconds ) 
65.75 
111.65 
False Alarms 
Sensor Time of False Alarm 
(seconds) 
P 
8-2 
65.8 
121.5 
TIME TO 
0.15 
X 
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the  FTS’s inability  to  correctly  distinguish  between  the  vertical  accelerometer  amp 
failure and MLS elevation. However, as seen previously in other examples, this type of 
false  alarm  (due  to  indistinguishability)  doesn’t  generate a missed  alarm,  rather  it 
simply takes longer to make a correct detection, and causes more of a disruption to 
the state estimates.  
The  stimation  error  profiles  again show the  ffects of a hard  reset .  I t  is 
especially  evident  inthe 4 estimation  error.  Otherwise,  the FTS behaves  quite 
reasonably, considering the number of failures simulated in this short run. 
3.4.4 Increased Scale Factor Failures 
Increased scale factor errors are quite different from bias failures, and therefore 
one  should  expect  o  see  degraded  performance  for  this  class of failures.  Consider 
the  following: a scale  factor  error may look  like a constant  bias  failure - if the  
signal level is constant;  or i t  may look like a time varying failure - if the signal level 
varies. In between these two extremes, the failure will look  like a combination of the 
two. In this  section,  performance of the FTS when increased  scale  factor  errors  are 
introduced will be discussed. 
Several  runs  were  made,  initially,  with  the  healer  logic  running,  however,  since 
the  failures  are a function of the  signal  and  noise  levels,  failed  sensors would heal 
a f t e r  a short  period of time  and we found  they  could  not  be  used  reliably  in  their 
present form (a  bias  failure mode is  implicitly  assumed  in  the  formulation of the 
healers). The run presented in this section, therefore, has the healers turned off. 
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TABLE 13. DETECTION  PERFORMANCE  FOR  AMP  FAILURES 
SENSOR 
TYPE 
Azm 
8-1 
P-1 
FA1 LURE MAG. 
.009O/s 
.3O/ s 
. 0c15°/s/s 
. 5m/s2/s 
False Alarm 4 Healings 
8 -2 
0,*2 
El -1 
RA- 2 
RA- 1 
FAILURE 
ONSET TIME 
7 seconds) 
66.85 
112.25 
154.1 
223.9 
TIME TO 
MTECT 
(seconds) 
2.30 
I . 9 
4.5 
6.6 
Time o f  Time o f  
Fa1 se Alarm Heal inas 
7 seconds) (seconds) 
115.95  121.05 
159.6  171.6 
230.9  233.9 
255.9  258. P 
261.85 X 
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A typical  run  containing  scale  factor  errors  is  shown  in  Table 14. Only input 
failures are considered, since they are the only sensors with normal operational scale 
factor   errors .  In this  run,  failures  are  simulated in A,,,  A,, P, and Q sensors. 
Surprisingly,  all  but  he  lateral  accelerometer  failures  were  correctly  detected. The 
failure times for this run were chosen so tha t  
o P 8c Q failures occur when their respective signal levels are low 
o A, failure  occurs when its signal  level  is large  (as  it always  is,  since  it 
measures the gravitational force) 
o A failure occurs when its signal is a t  a moderate and variable level 
Y 
From Table 14 we see  that  both  gyro  failures  and  the  vertical  accelerometer 
failure  were  all  correctly  detected, with detection  times  ranging from 0.9 to  
3.5 seconds. The lateral accelerometer failure was not detected; this could be caused 
by the lateral accelerometer bias estimte tracking the failure before the input sensor 
failure estimates have time to converge. 
The false  alarms  in Table 14 can  be  grouped  into  those  that  are a result of 
transients after the reset  ($,El,8), and those that are due to the missed  detection of 
the lateral accelerometer (Rng.A,). 
The  stimation  and A/C track  error  profiles  are  shown  in  Figures 37-42. In 
general, the filter estimates are much less fault tolerant for this type of failure. Some 
of the t ransients  in the velocity, attitude and accelerometer profiles are unacceptably 
large. In addition,  the A/C track  errors  were  observed  to  be  the  largest  for  this 
failure type. 
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The  estimation  error  curve  for  the  lateral  accelerometer  bias  looks  very  noisy. 
The signal plotted is actually the effective bias due to the scale factor failure and all 
other unmodeled effects, however, due to a recording error the noise signal itself was 
not  subtracted.   Since  this  scale  factor  error  curve  consists of a  time  varying  bias 
component  and  an  increased  noise  component,  the  correct  curve  would  look  exactly 
like  the  one  shown,  but  with  the  noise  portion  scaled down by the scale factor.  One 
plausible reason for the FTS’s inabili ty to detect  this failure is tha t  t he  rms value of 
this curve is close to zero - violating the basic premise that a failure really is a bias 
shift   in  the  signal.  Even if  there  is  a misdetection,  as  this  example  shows,  the FTS 
algorithm can still identify other sensor failures: 
3.4.5 Increased Noise  Failures 
Increased  noise  failures  are by nature  most different  from  the  underlying  bias 
failure assumptions used in the FTS. Since the r m s  value of the effective failure level 
is essentially zero, detections only occur if the noise level is large for a short period 
of time.  This  ection  discusses  the  performance of the  fault  tolerant  system  when 
increased noise failures are simulated. 
Although,  from  the  last  section, we know tha t  the  hea lers  a re  not  adequate  for  
these types of failure modes, in this section the healers were left operational in the 
FTS so t ha t  t he  r eade r  would be exposed to this aspect of the problem. 
Table 15 details   the  failure  performance of a  typical  sample  run  containing 
increased noise failures. The reader  will notice that the detection time is for the first 
detection - since many  false  healings/re-detections  occur  in  this  run  with  the 
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TABLE 14. DETECTION  PERFORMANCE  FOR  INCREASED  SCALE  FACTOR  FAILURES 
SENSOR FAILURE MAG. 
A -1 
Y 
2.5 (lOa> 
.4*-1 2.5 (lQa) 
P- 1 .l (loa) 
cl- 1 .1 (loa)- 
FAILUgE 
ONSET TIME 
(seconds) 
66.45 
1.51.8 
110.3 
225.95 
False Alarms (Healers  are  turned o f f )  
Sensor Time o f  False Alarm 
(seconds) 
Rng-2 m .  65 
8 -2 114.75 
El -2 154.15 
A X  181.1 
8 234.4 
TIME TO 
X 
1.85 
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healers  running. The detection  times  appear  to  be  quite  random  for  this  class of 
failure, except that detection times are uniformly longer for input sensors (since they 
are smoothed by the  no-fail filter) than for measurement sensors. 
The important  finding  is  that  all  the  failures  were  correctly  detected  and  that 
there  were  no  false a1,arms in the run. Moreover, the  constant  healing  and  detection 
with its  associated  filter  econfiguration  and  reset did not  interfere with correctly 
detecting the failures. Certainly the detection times for inputs are relatively long, but 
the fact  that  the simple blas jump model works a t  all is encouraging. 
Flgures 43-47 show the error estimation profiles for this run. The impact of the 
successive  resets  can  be  clearly  seen  in  these  figures. Notice tha t   he   e r rors   a re  
bounded and the filter doesn’t diverge due to these repetitive disturbances. In fact ,  if 
a more  robust  healer - or no  healer  at  all - were  used  the  performance would be 
somewhat better. 
3.5 Performance Summary and Overall Evaluation 
The previous  four  sections  have  described  in detail  the  performance of the 
developed  fault  .tolerant  system  under a variety of simulated  failure  conditions. In 
these  sections,  characteristics,  which  appeared  in our  study  to be common to a 
particular  class of failure,  were  highlighted  for  discussion.  This  ection will attempt 
to generalize the major findings. 
Table 16 shows an  overall  performance  summary  under  the  different  simulated 
failure conditions. As can be seen from the first  column, there  was complete coverage 
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TABLE 15. DETECTION  PERFORMANCE  FOR  INCREASED  NOISE  FAILURES 
TIME TO 
SENSOR 
TYPE . 
A,-1 
P- 1 
El -1 
8-1 
FA1 LIJRE MAG. 
.98m/s/s (100) 
.2O/S (loa) 
.3O/S ( 100) 
2.3' (100) 
FA1 LURE 
ONSET T P I E  
7 seconds 1 
113.05 
68.35 
152.6 
223.35 
Incorrect Heal ings/Detections 
Sensor Number of Occurrences 
A Z - 1  4 
P- 1 None 
E l  -1 16 
( F I R S T )  
DETECT 
(seconds) 
30.65 
55.75 
0.2 
2.0 
8- 1 8 
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TABLE 16.  . OVERALL  PERFORMANCE  SUMMARY 
FAILURE 
SEFJSOR 
A x  
.Y 
A Z  
P 
4 
R 
Azm 
E l  
Rng 
IAS 
Q 
e 
9 
R A  
3 . 3  
I.? 
0 . 7 9  
0 . 5  
1.5 
n. n5 
n. 7 
6.6 
4 . 5  
SINGLETON INCREASED  I PE SE  NULL HARDOVER MULTIPLE RAMP 
RST. IMlJ 
BIAS  NOISE SCALE  FACTOR FAILURE  FAILURE  FAILURE  FAILURE 
SINGLETON 
(SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC)  (SEC) 
BIAS 
4.65 
14.75  
N.D. 42.  S 
13.32   55 .75  
8 . 1 2  
6.1 
n. 9 
0.15 1.5 
17.08 
1.57 
0 . 5 7  
n. 43 
0 . 8  
0 . 3  
n. 05 
0 . 1 5  
0 . 0 8  
0. 637 2 . 3  n. 42 
0.2 0.18 
0.15 0.m 
0.4 
1.9 
0 . 1 5  
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for  bias  type  failures with the  exception of A,. The numbers  in Table 16 depict  the 
average time to detect over the available runs. Singleton bias failures were averaged 
over 3u,5u,8u,10u, and 12u bias levels.  Referring t o  Table 16. input  sensor 
(accelerometer  and  rate  gyro)  bias  failures  were  detected  and  isolated much slower 
than  the  other  sensors. That is, for  the same  level bias  type  failure,  the  detection 
speed  for  input  sensors  were  about 10 times  lower than  that of the measurement 
(MLS,IMU,IAS,RA) sensors. This is because the input sensor failures have to propagate 
through  the no-fail  filter dynamics  in order  to  get  detected. In our  study,  the 
redundancy  for the input  sensors were  utilized  only  for  backup.  Hence, the 
comparison of like  input  sensors may improve the  d tection  speed  for these 
instruments. 
The second column in Table 16 shows the  average  time-to-detect  for 1Ou 
increased noise type failures. For these failures, the detection speed for input sensor 
failures was about 20 times  slower than that of measurement sensor failures. On the 
other-hand, the average time-to-detect for the 100 level increased noise input sensor 
failures is about 10 times  slower than that for 3-5u bias type failures. Similarly, for 
measurement sensors, the average time-to-detect in the increased noise failure case 
is about twice as slow as that in the bias type failure case. This is to be expected 
since the bias type failure model used by the detectors is a poor model for increased 
noise type failures. As before, if  dual or more redundancy is available  for the input 
sensors  then  the  comparison monitoring of like  sensors may improve the  detection 
performance. 
The third column in Table 16 shows the  average  time-to-detect  for  increased 
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scale  factor  failures  with a 10u level.  Increased  scale  factor  failures  were  easier  to 
detect  than  increased  noise  type  failures  since  the  bias-type  failure model is 
adequate  in mulating  the  sensor  output  behavior  under a scale  factor  failure. 
Columns four and five show the average time-to-detect for null and hardover failures. 
Since hardover and null (if there  is a sizable signal level in the measurement) failures 
look  like a large  increased  bias jump to  detectors,  they  were  identified  within 
approximately  to 2 sampling  intervals. The relatively  longer  time-to-detect  for  null 
failure in the rate gyros indicates the need for a vehicle maneuver to detect this type 
of failure. 
Multiple sensor  failure  detection  performance  l vels  are  given  i   the  next 
column. As discussed  in  Section 2.4.2 simultaneous  failures  were  considered  only  for 
t h e  MLS sensors  since  these  failures  represent MLS antenna  failures. The detection 
speed for multiple failures is comparable to  that for the singleton bias failures. I t  is 
worth  noting  that a simultaneous MLS sensor  failure  never  introduced a false  alarm 
arising  from  the  selection of a singleton  failure  in  the  associated  instrument. The 
detection  performance  for  ramp  failures is given  in  the  last  column. The failures 
correspond to a ramp  failure  level  equal  to 3 times the normal operating bias in one 
second. The detection  speed  for  ramp  failures  was  slightly  slower  than  that  for  the 
corresponding bias-type failures. 
The final  column  summarizes  bias  failure  performance  using  the RSDIMU sensor 
configuration. In this  case  note  hat  detection  times  are  comparable  to  those 
obtained  with  the  standard  configuration. In addition,  no  false  alarms or missed 
detections were observed with the RSDIMU configuration. 
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The no-fail filter's state estimates were "fault tolerant" - Filter divergence, 
caused  by  failures,  occurred  infrequently  and  the  absolute  level of filter 
e r rors  was  within  tolerable  bounds  for  the  automatic  landing  system  to 
function properly. 
The reconfiguration  logic  worked  very well for  bias  failures - providing 
selective, moderate resets. For non-bias failures, resets were generally too 
hard. Suggestions have been offered for resolving these problems. 
Healer  mechanisims  worked well for bi.as. hardover,  and  ramp  failures,  but 
were inadequate - in its present form for other types of failure modes. 
As documented  in  this  chapter,  detection  speeds  were  quite good for  bias 
failures (with failure levels between 3 and 100). with detection times between 
4.65 and 14.65 seconds  for  input  sensors,  and 0.08 to  1.57 seconds  for  
measurement sensors. 
Detection  speeds  for  non-bias  failures  were in general  dequate. For 
increased noise failures the time-to-detect was random. 
The FTS was generally  able  to  distinguish  between  failures in  dynamically 
coupled  sensors,  (for  example, 4 and P). However, the  uncompensated 
normal operating errors in the sensors at times exacerbated this problem. 
False alarms were usually due to either: 
. uncompensated  normal  operating  errors 
. fi l ter  resets which  were too "hard" 
. occasional indistinguishability of dynamically coupled sensors 
. secondary effect of a missed detection. 
Missed detections were usually due to either: 
. the normal operating bias filter estimating out its effects  
. a simulated failure level that was too low relative to the signal, noise, 
and bias levels for that sensor 
. in  the  case of hardover  and  null  failures, i f  the  failure  was  not 
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detected very quickly the filter would diverge. 
o The method was observed to be surprisingly robust with regards to non-bias 
type  failures. However, explicit tests for  non-bias  failure,  (either model 
based or heuristic in nature) would be required for reliable detection. 
o Use of t h e  RSDIMU configuration provided: 
. slightly  better  estimation  performance 
. no false alarms or missed detections were observed 
. detection times were comparable to the standard configuration. 
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I 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study, we have developed a fault tolerant system design methodology for 
general  nonlinear  stochastic  dynamic  systems. In particular,  we have  applied  the 
developed  methodology  to  the  design of a sensor  fault  olerant  system in aircraft  
navigation, guidance, and control systems in a Microwave  Landing System environment. 
The fault  tolerant  system  provides  aircraft  position,  velocity,  attitude,  and  sensor 
normal  operating  bias  estimates  tolerant of faults  in  the  ground-based  navigation 
aids,  and  on-board  flight  control  and  navigation  sensors. We have  analyzed  the 
estimation  and  failure  detection  performance of the  software  implementation of our 
design (called FINDS) on the six-degree-of-freedom nonlinear digital simulation of the 
ATOPS aircraft .  
The state  and  normal  operating  sensor  bias  estimation  performance of the 
separated EKF algorithm  in FINDS compared  favorably with that  of other  navigation 
filters employed  within the same  nvironment.  Although  sensor  failures  are  modelled 
as bias jumps  in FINDS,  we have  investigated  the  failure  detection  performance  on 
other types of sensor failures as well. The failure detection and isolation performance 
of FINDS was excellent  for  bias  failures with the  detection  speed  considerably  better 
for measurement sensors such as MLS than for input sensors such a s  accelerometers. 
The failure  detection  performance  for  non-bias  type  failures was surprisingly  good, 
although healing tests designed for bias type failures caused problems, especially for 
increased  noise  type  failures. The detection  speed  for  catastrophic  failures  such as 
hardover w a s  extremely fast. 
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The following is a list of our recommendations for future study: 
o Although the simulation employed was fairly realistic, it did not account for 
s t ruc tura l  modes and  lever  arm  effects. We believe that  he  sensit ivity of 
t h e  FTS to  these  modelling errors can be uncovered by testing FINDS using 
flight recorded data. 
o In this  study,  computational  efficiency  was  not a major concern.  Hence,  the 
developed  algorithm  does  not  currently  run  in  real-time.  Analysis of the  
simulation  data  suggests  that  there  are  quite a number of simplifying 
assumptions  which  can  be  introduced  into  the  filter/detector  structure  for 
significantly improving computational efficiency. 
o There are  a number of places in FINDS which can be modified for  improved 
failure  detection  performance.  For  instance, a better  internal model for 
wind dynamics, the use of standby input sensors for failure detection, and a 
better integration routine for the kinematic equations are such examples. 
o Although the developed sensor failure detection algorithm, which is designed 
for  bias  type  failures,  proved  to be' capable of identifying  other  types of 
non-bias  sensor  failures,  it  is desirable  to  be  able  to  classify  these  non- 
bias  failures  as well. Such a classification would be  useful  in employing 
different types of healing tests for different types of sensor failures. 
o Although FINDS was tes ted within an  MLS environment,  the d veloped 
methodology is quite  general  nd  applicable  to  other  types of sensor 
environments  as well. For  instance, FINDS can  be  applied  to navigation 
under VORTAC, and  satellite  position  fixing  systems with appropriate 
modifications. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS OF USEFUL QUANTITIES 
This  appendix  basically  defines  the  quantities  used  in  the  no-fail filter and 
detector derivations. Specifically, the following quantities are defined herein: 
A se t  of abreviations, used to condense the descriptions, are given below: 
o se = sine(B) 
o ce = cosine(8) 
o te = tangent(@) 
o s e c e  = secant(8)  
o XG = Latitude  to rigin of G frame 
Descriptions: 
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where u = +-I/+.+ 
0 TBI T ~ ~ T ~ ~  Ti;~Ti  
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